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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CRISIS:
A QUALITATIVE EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION TO
THE COMPLIANCE DEBATE
Michael P. Scharf∗

ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner published The Limits of
International Law, a potentially revolutionary book that employs
rational choice theory to argue that international law is really just
“politics” and does not render a “compliance pull” on State decisionmakers. Critics have pointed out that Goldsmith and Posner’s
identification of the role of international law in each of their case
studies is largely conjectural, and that what is needed is qualitative
empirical data that identifies the international law-based arguments
that were actually made and the policy-makers’ responses to such
arguments. In an effort to fill this gap, with the support of a Carnegie
Corporation grant, the author convened a series of meetings and
exchanges with the ten living former State Department Legal Advisers
to discuss the influence of international law in the formulation of
foreign policy during times of crisis. This Article reviews the scholarly
debate about the nature of international legal obligation, presents the
∗ Michael P. Scharf is the John Deaver Drinko-Baker & Hostetler Professor of Law and
Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law. He served as Attorney-Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence, and
Attorney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs in the Office of Legal Adviser of the U.S.
Department of State from 1989-1993, and during a sabbatical in 2008 served as Special Assistant
to the Prosecutor of the U.N.-established Cambodia Genocide Tribunal. In 2005, Scharf and the
Public International Law and Policy Group, an NGO he co-founded and directs, were nominated
for the Nobel Peace Prize by the Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone for contributing
to peace and justice in Western Africa. The author thanks the Public International Law and
Policy Group and Carnegie Corporation for supporting this project, Dr. Paul Williams of the
American University Washington College of Law for helping to organize it, as well as the
following colleagues who provided comments on an early draft of this Article: Laura Dickinson
of Arizona State Law School, Charles Garraway of Chatham House, Larry Helfer of Vanderbilt
Law School, Linda Malone of William and Marry Law School, Greg McNeal of Penn State Law
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results of the Legal Advisers’ meetings, and provides an in depth
examination of a modern case study involving the treatment of detainees
in the war on terror which highlights the importance of these findings.
International law is not law; it is a series of political and moral
arrangements that stand or fall on their own merits, and anything else
is simply theology and superstition masquerading as law.
—Ambassador John Bolton1

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to ascertain the influence of
international law in the formation of American foreign policy in times
of crisis, using qualitative empirical data provided by a first-ever daylong meeting the author convened of all of the living former State
Department Legal Advisers. While the author was working on this
project, Professor Jack Goldsmith of Harvard Law School and Professor
Eric Posner of University of Chicago Law School published The Limits
of International Law,2 a potentially revolutionary work3 that employs
rational choice theory to argue that international law is really just
“politics” and that it is no more unlawful to contravene a treaty or a rule
of customary international law than it would be to disregard a nonbinding letter of intent.4 In an age in which a growing number of
academicians and even high level government officials deny there is
truly such a thing as binding international law, an understanding of the
role that the State Department Legal Advisor (L)5 and international law
1 John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs, 10 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 48 (2000) (Bolton served as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during the George W. Bush Administration).
2 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
3 George Washington University Law Professor Edward Swaine writes that U.S. elites may
seize on Goldsmith and Posner’s book to justify noncompliance with international law and may
have done so already. Edward Swaine, Restoring and (Risking) Interest in International Law,
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 259 (2006). University of Maryland Law Professor David Gray has opined
that Goldsmith and Posner’s views “are sure to become standard currency in international law
theory and practice.” David Gray, Rule-Skepticism, “Strategery,” and the Limits of International
Law, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 563, 583 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2).
4 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 90; see also Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a
Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1901 (2003).
5 “L” is the name by which the State Department Legal Adviser is known throughout the
U.S. government. It is also the name of his office, which includes over 170 Attorney-Advisers
stationed in Washington, D.C. and abroad. While L may be little known outside government
circles, the importance of the office is considerable: virtually no major foreign policy decision can
be made without first receiving L’s “clearance,” and no delegation can be sent to an international
negotiation or international organization without a representative of L. Just as the Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) serves as the government’s authority on constitutional and
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have played in shaping contemporary American foreign policy is more
important now than ever before.
In their quest to analyze the impact of international law in
America’s response to major world events, scholars such as Goldsmith
and Posner predictably pore over historic documents chronicling the
details of a given crisis. Yet, viewing a crisis from the outside of an
opaque box in this way presents a woefully incomplete and often
misleading picture. For what John Chipman Gray wrote in 1927
remains true today: “On no subject of human interest, except theology,
has there been so much loose writing and nebulous speculation as on
International Law.”6 To fill this void, many commentators have opined
that what is needed is qualitative empirical data that traces the
contribution of the key individuals and the arguments they made from
the genesis of the international dispute to its resolution.7 A logical
place to start such an examination is with the U.S. government official
most responsible for advocating, interpreting, and applying international
law: the State Department Legal Adviser.
Thus, with the support of a Carnegie Corporation grant, in 2004,
the author, working with Dr. Paul Williams of American University,
convened a historic day-long meeting of all the living former State
Department Legal Advisers at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Washington, D.C. Fortunately, the group has
enjoyed exceptionally good health and longevity, and the author was
able to assemble eight former Legal Advisers covering thirty years of
experience: Herb Hansel (Carter Administration), Roberts Owen (Carter
Administration), Davis Robinson (Reagan Administration), Abe Sofaer
(Reagan and Bush Administrations), Edwin Williamson (Bush
Administration),
Michael
Matheson
(Bush
and
Clinton
Administrations), Conrad Harper (Clinton Administration), and David
Andrews (Clinton Administration). Subsequently, William H. Taft, IV
and John Bellinger, the Legal Advisers in the George W. Bush
Administration, provided extensive answers to the author’s questions
via an exchange of emails, which brought the project up to date.
In his seminal treatise, Professor Louis Henkin wrote: “[A]lmost
all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost
all of their obligations almost all of the time.”8 While not taking issue
statutory questions, L serves as the government’s principal expert in international legal affairs.
And just as the Solicitor General argues cases for the government before the U.S. Supreme Court,
L argues on behalf of the United States at the International Court of Justice and other
international tribunals. See Richard B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State
Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 633, 634 (1963).
6 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 127 (1921).
7 Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1441 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2).
8 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979)
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with the claim itself, Professor Posner dismisses the importance of
Henkin’s observation by arguing that this so-called widespread
compliance only reflects a coincidence of interest. Posner compares the
situation to a society where “there are only a few, weak laws that
already reflect people’s interests—you must eat at least once every day,
you must wear clothes on cold days. The observation that people in this
society frequently obey the law is of little value.”9 To rise to Posner’s
challenge, the conveners asked the Legal Advisers to focus the
discussion on the hardest cases—those implicating essential national
interests in times of international crisis.
Over the course of the day, each Legal Adviser was asked to
recount the role that his office and international law played in
responding to the three most important international crises occurring
during his tenure. Each presentation was followed by a series of
penetrating and provocative questions and comments posed by the other
Legal Advisers, as well as by the conveners (who had, themselves,
served as Attorney-Advisers in L during the Bush and Clinton
Administrations). The presentations and Q&A were transcribed by a
court reporter, and the Legal Advisers gave the conveners permission to
reproduce the complete edited transcript in a forthcoming book to be
published by Cambridge University Press.10
While the qualitative empirical data relied on for this Article
provides a unique perspective into the question of whether international
law exerts “a compliance pull” on government officials, certain limits
must be recognized regarding the value of the author’s approach.11
Since the accounts of the Legal Advisers were not contemporaneous
with the events that they describe, for example, there is the potential
that the data has been affected by selective memory and revisionism. In
addition, the conference format did not permit the Legal Advisers to
discuss the role of international law in every crisis on their watch, but
rather just those each Legal Adviser considered as the major crises, thus
presenting a narrower and more subjective data set; this methodological
deficiency was potentially compounded by the author’s selection of the
quotes from the lengthy transcript of the meeting to reproduce in this
Article. Moreover, while L plays an important role with respect to the

(emphasis omitted).
9 Posner, supra note 4, at 1916.
10 MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF
CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER
(forthcoming 2010).
11 For background about and a critique of qualitative research methods and techniques, see
MATTHEW B. MILES & A. MICHAEL HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: AN
EXPANDED SOURCEBOOK (2d ed. 1994); MICHAEL QUINN PATTON, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
AND EVALUATION METHODS (3d ed. 2002); THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
(Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 3d ed. 2005).
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U.S. government’s interpretation and application of international law,
there are other legal officers within the bureaucracy (such as at the
White House, the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of
Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Commerce Department),
whose influence relative to L’s rises and falls depending on the type of
international issue or political factors. Thus, the focus on L only tells
part of the story within a disaggregated government. Finally, the data is
admittedly U.S.-centric, though the Article also draws from a panel of
foreign ministry legal advisers from several different countries that the
author organized in 2005 in an effort to add comparative insights to this
project.
In discussing the role of international law during times of crisis,
five fundamental questions about the nature of international law and the
role of the Legal Adviser emerged from the day-long colloquy and
subsequent emails with the Legal Advisers. The first is whether
international law is really law, such that it should be treated as
constraining what the United States, as the world’s greatest economic
and military power, seeks to accomplish on the world stage. The
second is whether the international legal rules relevant to a particular
situation or crisis are ever clear enough to be interpreted as dictating
how the U.S. Government must act. The third is whether the Legal
Adviser has a duty to oppose policies or proposed actions that conflict
with international law in those situations where such conflict is
objectively manifest. The fourth is whether the position taken by the
Legal Adviser is seen as influential, if not controlling, within the
government in such situations. And the fifth is whether international
law is generally seen by the Legal Advisers to advance or to hinder the
U.S. government’s interests in times of crisis.
Before addressing these questions, the Article begins with a review
of the scholarly debate about the nature of international legal obligation.
This is followed by a discussion of the results of this study, as well as a
modern case study involving the treatment of detainees in the war on
terror which highlights the importance of these findings.
I. THE COMPLIANCE DEBATE
Since the decline of the Roman Empire and the attendant
weakening of the Roman Legion at the end of the fourth century A.D.
there has existed no sort of constabulary to implement rules of
international law. Subsequently, international rules have been subject to
sporadic enforcement through protest and condemnation, reciprocal
suspension of rights and benefits, unilateral or multilateral economic
and political sanctions, and sometimes through individual or collective
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use of armed force.
Lacking a pervasive and effective enforcement mechanism,
scholars and policy-makers have pondered whether international law is
really binding law. The question has been debated since ancient times
and remains one of the most contested questions in international
relations. As described below, major historic developments, such as the
Peace of Westphalia, the conclusion of the Second World War, the
onset of the Cold War, the proliferation of international institutions in
the 1970s and 80s, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, and the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have each rekindled and
reshaped the debate.
To understand how the historic context affects the debate about
whether international law is really law, it is helpful to draw upon the
theory of Semiotics (pronounced sem-ee-AH-tiks). Semiotics (from the
Greek semeion, meaning “sign”) was developed by Charles Peirce in the
nineteenth century as the study of how meaning of signs, symbols, and
language is constructed and understood.12 Umberto Eco made a wider
audience aware of semiotics through several notable books including his
best-selling novel, The Name of the Rose, which includes applied
semiotic operations.13 Semiotics begins with the assumption that
phrases, such as “international law,” are not historic artifacts whose
meaning remains static over time. Rather, the meaning of such terms
changes along with the interpretive community or communities. As
applied to law, semiotics theory posits that “different conceptions of the
nature and character of the legal community give rise to different
interpretations of the meaning of the rules and principles of positive
law . . . .”14 Although not himself a semiotician, Oliver Wendell
Holmes captured the essence of semiotics when he famously observed:
“The life of the law has not been logic[;] it has been experience.”15
This Part therefore begins by examining the development of the
major schools of compliance theory in the context of their historic
setting and with reference to the relevant interpretive communities.
Though scholars writing on this subject often perceive or present
themselves as pure scientists examining the question solely in the
abstract, the field is more akin to applied science and the conscious or
subconscious agendas of those writing in it are comprehensible only in
12 See 5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE:
PRAGMATISM AND PRAGMATICISM (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1935).
13 UMBERTO ECO, THE NAME OF THE ROSE (1983); UMBERTO ECO, SEMIOTICS AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1984); UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (1976).
14 Wouter Werner, The Unnamed Third: Roberta Kevelson’s Legal Semiotics and the
Development of International Law, 12 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 309, 309 (1999); see also Susan W.
Tiefenbrun, Legal Semiotics, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 89, 92 (1986) (“Legal practice is a
general exercise in interpretation.”).
15 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover 1991) (1881).
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light of the background events and developments at the time of their
publications and an understanding of the audience they are seeking to
influence. With this in mind, the Article then focuses on the
contemporary debate, while probing the underlying motivations of the
major participants and their perceptions of the community that they are
trying to influence with their arguments.
A.

Compliance Theory in Historical Context

The modern age of international law is said to have been
inaugurated with the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia, which ended the
Thirty Years War by acknowledging the sovereign authority of various
European Princes.16 During the next three-hundred years, up until
World War II, there were four major schools of thought regarding the
binding nature of international law.17 The first was “an Austinian
positivistic realist strand,” which held that nations never obey
international law because it is not really law.18 The second was a
“Hobbesian utilitarian, rationalistic strand” which held that nations
sometimes follow international law, but only when it serves their selfinterest to do so.19 The third was a “Kantian liberal strand,” which held
that nations generally obey international law out of a sense of moral and
ethical obligation derived from considerations of natural law and
justice.20 The fourth was a Bentham “process-based strand,” which held

16 Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENVER J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 373, 375 n.20 (2003) (“The Peace of Westphalia was composed of two separate
agreements: (1) the Treaty of Osnabruck concluded between the Protestant Queen of Sweden and
her allies on the one side, and the Holy Roman Habsburg Emperor and the German Princes on the
other; and (2) the Treaty of Munster concluded between the Catholic King of France and his allies
on the one side, and the Holy Roman Habsburg Emperor and the German Princes on the other.
The Conventional view of the Peace of Westphalia is that by recognizing the German Princes as
sovereign, these treaties signaled the beginning of a new era. But in fact, the power to conclude
alliances formally recognized at Westphalia was not unqualified, and was in fact a power that the
German Princes had already possessed for almost half a century. Furthermore, although the
treaties eroded some of the authority of the Habsburg Emperor, the Empire remained a key actor
according to the terms of the treaties. For example, the Imperial Diet retained the powers of
legislation, warfare, and taxation, and it was through Imperial bodies, such as the Diet and the
Courts, that religious safeguards mandated by the Treaty were imposed on the German Princes.”).
17 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2613
(1997).
18 Id. at 2611; see also JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 127,
201 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1954) (1832).
19 Koh, supra note 17, at 2611; see also ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS 58-59, 112-25 (1947) (discussing the contributions of Thomas Hobbes and
other early positivists).
20 Koh, supra note 17, at 2611; see also Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A
Philosophical Sketch (1795), reprinted in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 107 (Ted
Humphrey trans., 1983).
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that nations are induced to obey from the encouragement and prodding
of other nations through a discursive legal process.21 The modern
debate has its roots in these four theoretical approaches.
In the aftermath of World War II, the victorious Allies sought to
establish a “new world order,” replacing the “loose customary web of
state-centric rules” with a rules-based system, built on international
conventions and international institutions such as the United Nations
Charter, which created the Security Council, General Assembly, and
International Court of Justice; the Bretton Woods Agreement, which
established the World Bank and International Monetary Fund; and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which ultimately led to the
creation of the World Trade Organization.22 The new system reflected
a view that international rules would promote Western interests, serve
as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and emphasize values to be
marshaled against fascist threats.23
Yet the effectiveness of the new system was immediately undercut
by the intense bipolarity of the Cold War. In the 1940s, political
science departments at U.S. universities received from the German
refugees (such as Hans Morgenthau, who is credited with founding the
field of international relations in the United States) “an image of
international law as Weimar law writ large[:] formalistic, moralistic,
and unable to influence the realities of international life.”24 With fear
of communist expansion pervading the debate, the positivistic, realist
strand came to dominate Western scholarly discourse on the nature of
international obligation. Thus, one of America’s leading post-war
international relations theorists, George F. Kennan, attacked the Kantian
approach as anathema to American foreign policy interests, saying:
“[T]he belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and
dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field by the
acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints [is an approach
that] runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty
years.”25
Even during the height of the Cold War, however, international
law had its defenders, and within the American legal academy a new
school of thought arose with roots in the Bentham strand, based on
notions of legal process. Thus, the writings of Harvard Law professors
21 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 538, 540, 552-54 (John Bowring
ed., 1843).
22 Koh, supra note 17, at 2615.
23 Philippe Sands, Mischon Lecture 2005, Lawless World: International Law After 9/11 and
Iraq (May 18, 2005), available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/mishcon/docs/Mishcon_2005_
Sands.pdf.
24 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 471 (2001).
25 GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 95 (1951).
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Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, and Andreas Lowenfeld, and Yale
Law professors Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, hypothesized
that compliance with international law could be explained by reference
to the process by which these actors interact in a variety of public and
private fora.26 As Abram Chayes, who had himself once served as State
Department Legal Adviser, put it: international law may not be
determinative in international affairs, but it is relevant and influences
foreign policy “first, as a constraint on action; second, as the basis of
justification or legitimization for action; and third, as providing
organizational structures, procedures, and forums” within which
political decisions may be reached.27 The process approach was later
refined by Harvard Law Professors Henry Steiner and Detlev Vagts and
Yale Law Professor Harold Koh. This approach includes, in addition to
States and international organizations, multinational enterprises,
nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals, which all
interact in a variety of domestic and international fora to make,
interpret, internalize, and enforce rules of international law.28
During the 1970s and 80s, the legal landscape underwent another
major transformation, with the proliferation, growth, and strengthening
of countless international regimes and institutions. Despite the
bipolarity of the Cold War, international cooperation had persisted, and
was facilitated by treaties and organizations providing channels for
dispute-settlement, requiring States to furnish information regarding
compliance, and authorizing retaliatory actions in cases of noncompliance. During this period, international relations scholars
developed “regime theory,” the study of principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures that govern such areas as international
peacekeeping and debt management.29 At heart, the regime theorists
were rationalists, viewing compliance with international law as a
function of the benefits such compliance provides.
This same period saw a revival of the Kantian philosophical
tradition. N.Y.U. Law Professor Thomas Frank sought to answer the
question, “Why do powerful nations obey powerless rules?,” in his
path-breaking The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations.30 Frank’s
26 Professor Koh distinguishes between the Harvard and Yale methods, observing that the
Harvard approach focused on process as policy constraint while the New Haven approach was
more value-oriented, focusing on process as policy justification. Koh, supra note 17, at 2623.
27 ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF
LAW 7 (1974); see also ABRAM CHAYES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS (1968)
(containing cases and materials demonstrating the “legal process” approach).
28 HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEV F. VAGTS & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS (4th ed. 1994).
29 See INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); ROBERT O. KEOHANE,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY (1989).
30 THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3 (1990).
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answer: “Because they perceive the rule and its institutional penumbra
to have a high degree of legitimacy.”31 According to Frank, it is the
legitimacy of the process that “exerts a pull to compliance.”
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1989 had a significant effect on compliance scholarship. With the
dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the end of Apartheid in South Africa,
and the United Nation’s defeat of Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert
Storm, the 1990s were a period of unparalleled optimism about the
prospects of international law and international institutions. At the
same time, conflict in failed States like Somalia and Haiti, the violent
break up of the former Yugoslavia, and the tribal carnage in Rwanda
presented new challenges that severely tested the efficacy of
international rules and institutions. Meanwhile, the status of the United
States as the “sole remaining superpower” encouraged triumphalism,
exceptionalism, and an upsurge of U.S. provincialism and isolationism,
as well as a preference to act unilaterally rather than multilaterally.32
During this decade, scholarly writing about compliance with
international law featured four prevailing views.
The first was an “instrumentalist” strand which, like its
predecessors, applied rational choice theory to argue that States only
obey international law when it serves their self-interest to do so. What
differentiated modern rationalists such as Robert Keohane,33 Duncan
Snidal,34 Kenneth Abbott,35 and John Setear36 from their realist
forerunners was the sophistication of their version of the prisoner’s
dilemma game, introducing international institutions and transnational
actors, disaggregating the State into its component parts, and
incorporating notions of long-term as well as short-term interests.
The second was a “liberal internationalist” strand, led by the Dean
of Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School, Anne-Marie Slaughter, who
posited that compliance depends on whether or not the State can be
characterized as “liberal” in identity (e.g., marked by a democratic
representative government, guarantees of civil and political rights, and
an independent judicial system).37 Slaughter and other liberal theorists
31
32

Id. at 25.
JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 7 (2004).
33 Robert O. Keohane, Jr., International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, Sherrill
Lecture at Yale Law School (Feb. 22, 1996), quoted in Koh, supra note 17, at 2632 n.171.
34 Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International
Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985).
35 Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335 (1989).
36 John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations
Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L. J. 139 (1996).
37 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L.
503 (1995).
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argued that liberal democracies are more likely to comply with
international law in their relations with one another, while relations
between liberal and illiberal States will more likely be conducted
without serious deference to international law.
The third, an outgrowth of Kantian theory, was a “constructivist”
strand, which argued that the norms of international law, the values of
the international community, and the structure of international society
have the power to reshape national interests.38 According to the
constructivists, States obey international rules because a repeated habit
of obedience transforms their interests so that they come to value rule
compliance.
The fourth post-Cold War approach was a refurbishment of the
Harvard/New Haven “institutionalist approach,” as embodied in works
by Abram and Antonia Chayes and Harold Koh. In The New
Sovereignty, the Chayeses dismiss the importance of coercive
enforcement, pointing out that “sanctioning authority is rarely granted
by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when
used.”39
Instead, they offer a “management model” in which
compliance is induced through interactive processes of justification,
discourse, and persuasion. According to the Chayeses, the impetus for
compliance is not so much a nation’s fear of sanction as it is fear of
diminution of status through loss of reputation. To improve
compliance, the Chayeses propose a range of “instruments of active
management,” such as transparency, reporting and data collection,
verification and monitoring, dispute settlement, capacity-building, and
strategic review and assessment.
Harold Koh, who was appointed State Department Legal Adviser
of the Obama Administration in 2009, has sought to add an additional
level of sophistication to process theory by explaining how and why
States internalize the constraining norms through judicial incorporation,
legislative embodiment, and executive acceptance.40 According to Koh,
when a State fails to comply with international law, frictions are created
that can negatively affect the conduct of a State’s foreign relations and
frustrate its foreign policy goals. To avoid such frictions in its
continuing interactions, the State will shift over time from a policy of
violation to one of grudging compliance to eventual habitual

38 THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 17-19
(Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996); INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 4-8 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996); FRIEDRICH V.
KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND
LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS (1989).
39 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 32-33, 197 (1995).
40 Koh, supra note 17, at 2602-03, 2641.
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internalized obedience.41
B.

The Compliance Debate after 9/11

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon of
September 11, 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 inaugurated
the current period of compliance scholarship. In the aftermath of 9/11,
the United States launched a “preventive war” against Iraq that was
widely viewed outside the United States as unjustifiable under
international law and then implemented policies regarding the detention
and treatment of suspected terrorists that were harshly criticized as
inconsistent with international law requirements. In seeking to
minimize the impact of international law on the Bush Administration’s
foreign policy agenda, then Ambassador to the United Nations, John
Bolton, said:
It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law
even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so—because,
over the long term, the goal of those who think that international law
really means anything are those who want to constrict the United
States.42

The term “lawfare” was coined,43 and the Bush Administration’s official
National Defense Strategy compared the use of international “judicial
processes” to terrorism, concluding that both are “strateg[ies] of the
weak” that threaten “[o]ur strength as a nation state.”44
The
Administration even persuaded Congress to enact legislation that
prohibited U.S. courts from considering international law or
jurisprudence in determining the validity of detentions of suspected
terrorists at Guantanamo Bay.45
It was in this context that Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith,
who had served as Assistant Attorney General and head of the
41
42

Id. at 2655-56.
Samantha Power, Boltonism, NEW YORKER, Mar. 21, 2005, at 23, available at
http://newyorker.com/archive/2005/03/21/050321ta_talk_power.
43 The term was apparently coined by Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.—at a speech at
Harvard’s Carr Center in 2001—who now defines it as “the strategy of using—or misusing—law
as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.” Major General
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Prospective, YALE J. INT’L AFFAIRS, Winter 2008, at
146, 146. As neoconservative lawyers David Rivkin and Lee Casey have put it, lawfare aims to
“gain a moral advantage over your enemy in the court of world opinion, and potentially a legal
advantage in national and international tribunals.” Scott Horton, State of Exception: Bush’s War
on the Rule of Law, HARPER’S, July 2007, at 74, 74, available at http://www.harpers.org/
archive/2007/07/0081595.
44 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 6 (2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408
strategy.pdf.
45 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
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Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from
October 2003 to June 2004, along with Chicago University Law
Professor Eric Posner, published The Limits of International Law at the
start of the Bush Administration’s second term in 2005.46 The book,
which is an expanded and more sophisticated version of Posner’s 2003
article, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International
Law?,47 deploys economic-based rational choice theory, using modeling
techniques derived from game theory, to advance the thesis that neither
customary international law nor treaty-based international law have any
“exogenus influence on state behavior.”48 In other words, according to
Goldsmith and Posner, when States act in accordance with international
law it is not because of its moral pull or a preference for abiding with
law, but rather solely due to self-interest.49
Using a variety of illustrative historical case studies involving
international agreements (e.g., human rights treaties and trade treaties)
as well as customary international law (e.g., ambassadorial immunity
and free passage of neutral ships), Goldsmith and Posner propound four
models that seek to explain away the behavior that legal scholars have
termed “compliance” with international law. The first model,
“coincidence,” proposes that States may act in accordance with
international law simply by acting in their own self-interest, with no
regard to international rules or the interests of other States. The second
model, “coordination,” describes instances in which two or more States
create and abide by a rule not out of a sense of obligation, but simply
because it is convenient. The third model, “cooperation,” applies to
situations in which States reciprocally refrain from activities that would
otherwise be in their short-term self-interest in order to reap larger longterm benefits. The fourth model, “coercion,” results when a State with
greater power forces a weaker State to engage in acts that benefit the
more powerful State.
Based on their rational choice analysis, Goldsmith and Posner
conclude that States have no preference for compliance with
international law; they are unaffected by the “legitimacy” of a rule of
law; past consent to a rule does not generate compliance; and decision
makers do not internalize a norm of compliance with international law.
States therefore employ international law when it is convenient, are free
to ignore it when it is not, and have every right to place their sovereign
interests first—indeed democratic States have an obligation to do so
when international law threatens to undermine federalism, separation of

46
47
48
49

GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2.
Posner, supra note 4, at 1918.
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 43.
Id. at 225.
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powers, and domestic sovereignty.50
In The Terror Presidency, a 2007 memoir of his days as one of the
Bush Administration’s top lawyers, Goldsmith candidly reveals the
underlying normative purpose behind The Limits of International Law.
Goldsmith writes:
Many people think the Bush administration has been indifferent to
wartime legal constraints. But the opposite is true: the
administration has been strangled by law, and since September 11,
2001, this war has been lawyered to death. The administration has
paid attention to law not necessarily because it wanted to, but rather
because it [believed that it] had no choice.”51

While Special Counsel to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and
later as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the OLC, Goldsmith
saw it as his mission to convince those inside the government that
international rules that constrain U.S. power and thus compromise
national security are not really binding. A 2003 inter-agency memo
prepared by Goldsmith on “the judicialization of international
politics,”52 warns: “In the past quarter century, various nations, NGOs,
academics, international organizations, and others in the ‘international
community’ have been busily weaving a web of international laws and
judicial institutions that today threatens [U.S. government]
interests.”53 The memo continues: “The [U.S. government] has
seriously underestimated this threat, and has mistakenly assumed that
confronting the threat will worsen it . . . . Unless we tackle the problem
head-on, it will continue to grow. The issue is especially urgent
because of the unusual challenges we face in the war on terrorism.”54
The Limits of International Law can therefore be understood as
Goldsmith’s effort to bring this “anti-lawfare” argument to a wider
audience.
As Professor Allen Buchanan of Duke University has pointed out,
Goldsmith and Posner’s “normative claims, if valid, would lend support
to the view that it is wholly permissible for the U.S. government to take
a purely instrumental stance toward international law, and that its
citizens do not have a moral obligation to try to prevent their
government from doing so.”55 Similarly, Professor Oona Hathaway of
Yale Law School has concluded that there is a necessary connection
50 Goldsmith and Posner are particularly concerned about international law’s propensity to
shift decisional authority from local government and the federal executive to international
institutions and activist federal judges.
51 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 69 (2007).
52 Id. at 63.
53 Id. at 60.
54 Id.
55 Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L
COMP. L. 305, 307-08 (2006).
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between Goldsmith and Posner’s underlying “revisionist” political
agenda and their book’s methodological approach and conclusions.56
And as Professor Margaret McGuinness of the University of MissouriColumbia observes: “[T]he book cannot be viewed as separate from the
authors’ broader normative project—a project that seeks to minimize
U.S. participation in international institutions and to limit the
application of international law in the United States by expanding
presidential power and limiting the role of the judiciary.”57 Finally,
Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell of Notre Dame warns: “A policymaker reading the book might well conclude that compliance with
international law, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the
Convention against Torture, is optional . . . .”58
While many realists and rationalists immediately embraced
Goldsmith and Posner’s approach and conclusions, their book was met
with criticism by institutionalists and constructivists, who sought to
disprove their thesis in several ways. To start with, Professor Peter
Spiro of Temple University points out that many of Goldsmith and
Posner’s reasons for dismissing international law as something less than
real law would apply to domestic law as well. Their assertion that
“[d]omestic law is enforced in well-ordered societies,” whereas
“international law is not reliably enforced,”59 flies in the face of the
actual data, including the fact that murder cases have only a sixty-five
percent clearance rate in the United States.60
Although international law has traditionally employed horizontal
rather than vertical mechanisms of enforcement (such as protests,
reciprocal suspension of compliance, and breaking of diplomatic
relations) and such enforcement has rarely been bolstered by the use of
force, this “does not necessarily detract from its salience as a regulator
of behavior.”61 It just means international law is more like domestic
contract law than domestic tort or criminal law. And while some States
violate the Torture Convention’s prohibitions on inhumane treatment,
the Geneva Convention’s prohibition on war crimes, and the U.N.
Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, this does not mean that these
international rules have no consequence. As with the sixty-five m.p.h.
speed limit, international law may not exert a moral pull nor enjoy
perfect compliance, but it does deter and constrain unlawful behavior at
56
57

Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 7, at 1404.
Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights Law, 34 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 421 (2006).
58 MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 104
(2009).
59 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 195.
60 Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 445, 452
n.16 (2006).
61 Id. at 451.
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the margins. Finally, while nearly all international law scholars will
acknowledge that if State interests are powerful enough, they may
trump contrary international law norms, the same is true with respect to
contracts in domestic law. That a business or individual may choose to
break a legally binding contract (and suffer the consequences thereof)
does not mean that contract law is not real law.
Another criticism of the Goldsmith/Posner paradigm, made by
Professor Kenneth Anderson of American University, concerns their
underlying assumption that the only possible basis of legal obligation is
morality. Anderson points out that a sense of legal obligation can be
based on instrumentalist concerns about reputation as a law-abiding
State, long-term self-interest in the maintenance of order, or long-term
self-interest in a functioning legal system. In seeking to circumvent this
objection, Goldsmith and Posner never explain what they believe
constitutes the self-interests of States. Rather, they provide a circular
approach that is so open-ended that it renders their theory “an empty
vessel.”62 In particular, critics argue that by defining reputation as one
of a State’s instrumentalist interests rather than considering it part of the
pull of international law, Goldsmith and Posner have rendered their
theory non-falsifiable and lacking in predictive value. As Professor
Daniel Bodanski of the University of Georgia notes, under Goldsmith
and Posner’s approach, “international law cannot be an exogenous
influence on state behavior for the simple reason that it has already been
made endogenous.”63
Goldsmith and Posner attempt to answer this criticism by
observing that in any event, reputational considerations have little
impact on State behavior. But Professor David M. Golove of N.Y.U.
takes issue with this supposition, which arises out of Goldsmith and
Posner’s single-issue game approach using the prisoner’s dilemma
model. According to Professor Golove, the metaphorical games that
States actually play are vastly more complex. “States repeatedly and
intensively interact across a wide range of subject areas, and they do so
indefinitely into the future.”64 Viewing international interaction instead
as a “super game” requires that significantly more value be placed on
reputation than Goldsmith and Posner are willing to acknowledge.
States obtain a benefit if they are perceived as reliable partners not just
with the particular State on the particular issue in question in a given
interaction, but also with third States on a range of issues long into the

62 Kenneth Anderson, Remarks by an Idealist on the Realism of The Limits of International
Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253, 280-81 (2006).
63 Daniel Bodansky, International Law in Black and White, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285,
295 (2006).
64 David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is: Goldsmith and
Posner’s The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 333, 345 (2006).
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future. Moreover, once a norm is named a customary international law
rule or is codified in a treaty to which a State is a party, violation of that
norm will have far more serious reputational costs.65
Goldsmith and Posner’s response is to argue that State reputations
are compartmentalized. For example, they assert that a State might
have a good record complying with trade treaties and a bad record
complying with environmental treaties, and that the State’s trading
partners will not hold its environmental shortcomings against it.66 If
this were true, answers Golove, it would only mean that preserving the
State’s reputation as a law-abiding State would be more significant with
respect to that State’s trade relations than in the environmental domain;
it would not mean that reputation is irrelevant. Nor does their selfevident assertion that “a reputation for compliance will not always be of
paramount concern”67 mean that reputation should automatically be
dismissed as inconsequential. If compliance reputation makes a
difference at the margins, putting a thumb on the scale in favor of
compliance, then it is neither irrelevant nor inconsequential.
A further criticism of the Goldsmith/Posner approach is that in
order to fit within their simplified prisoner dilemma game theory, they
begin with the assumption that the relevant actor is the “State” as a
unitary player, represented by what Goldsmith and Posner call its
leaders. The State as they conceive it does not reflect multiple power
bases and multiple agendas. To better mirror reality, Professor Spiro
suggests that the State should be disaggregated and understood as a
nexus of competing and contradictory actors which influence its
behavior, including bureaucratic subsets within the Executive Branch,
political subsets within the Congress, Supreme Court and lower court
judges in the Judiciary Branch, and nongovernmental organizations
outside the government.68
A final critique concerns Goldsmith and Posner’s methodology.
According to Professor Andrew T. Guzman of U.C. Berkely’s Boalt
Hall School of Law, Goldsmith and Posner’s aim is to debunk the
constructivist theory of compliance, but they do so through selective use
of a handful of case studies which are no more than anecdotal in nature,
and their identification of the controlling state interests in each is almost
entirely conjectural. In addition, they offer no explanation for how they
chose the particular historical events that they employ, nor do they cite
to other scholars of history or political science who concur with their

65 Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265,
1294 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2).
66 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 102.
67 Id. at 103.
68 Spiro, supra note 60, at 454-62; Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in
International Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 195.
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appraisals of those events. In contrast, several scholars that have
carefully examined the case studies set forth in The Limits of
International Law have concluded that “at least some of those case
studies are consistent with competing claims.”69
Moreover, where a case study reveals a State’s compliance with an
accepted rule (as most of Goldsmith and Posner’s do), it is difficult to
determine without qualitative empirical data (which Goldsmith and
Posner do not provide) whether the State complied out of self-interest,
out of a sense of duty to uphold the law, or a mix of both. As Professor
Oona Hathaway points out, with respect to international law—which is
primarily consent-based—“utility-seeking and law-abiding behavior
will often be one and the same.”70 Professor Golove observes that
“Goldsmith and Posner make little effort to investigate direct historical
evidence . . . of the actual motivations of the individuals who made the
decisions on which they focus. Instead they focus on the events
themselves and draw speculative inferences about why [S]tates acted as
they did.”71 By employing the qualitative empirical data obtained from
the day-long conference of State Department Legal Advisers and
follow-up emails, this project seeks to fill the void, enabling the reader
to discern which side of the debate better reflects reality.
II. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
A.

L’s View of International Law

This Article began with five questions about the nature of
international law and the role of the State Department Legal Adviser.
The following answers emerged from the discourse with the ten former
State Department Legal Advisers.
1.

Did the Legal Advisers perceive international law to be binding
law?

Since the dawn of the Cold War, there has been a rich tradition of
skepticism about the “legality” of international law on both ends of the
69 Andrew T. Guzman, The Promise of International Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 533, 540 (2006)
(book review) (arguing that Goldsmith and Posner misrepresent the facts in their international
trade case study); see also Golove, supra note 64, at 353 (arguing that Goldsmith and Posner’s
account is cherry-picked and fails to present a fair picture of the “free ships, free goods”
example).
70 Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 7, at 1416 n.35.
71 Golove, supra note 64, at 348.
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political spectrum. This Article begins with a quote from John Bolton,
the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. during the Bush Administration, who
declared: “International law is not law; it is a series of political and
moral arrangements that stand or fall on their own merits, and anything
else is simply theology and superstition masquerading as law.”72 None
of the ten former State Department Legal Advisers would agree with
that proposition. They all perceived international law as real law that is
binding on the United States and operates as a constraint on policymakers, even where there are important national security interests at
stake.73 Moreover, even where international law seemed in the shortterm to hinder U.S. foreign policy goals, the Legal Advisers agreed that
America’s longer-term interests in protecting U.S. citizens abroad and
in effectively conducting foreign policy counsel for policies that uphold
the integrity and stability of international law.
At the same time, they acknowledged that their clients were often
leery of the relevance of international law, and with few exceptions,
there were no extant domestic or international institutions with authority
to opine on the legality of a particular U.S. foreign policy decision.
This does not mean, however, that the Legal Advisers did not perceive
that there were serious consequences that flow from violating bilateral
treaties, multilateral conventions, or rules of customary international
law. The Legal Advisers all recognized (and advised policy-makers)
that violations can engender international condemnation, strain relations
with allies, and interfere with the ability of the United States to obtain
international support for important policy initiatives, such as fighting
international terrorism, suppressing narcotics trafficking, controlling
weapons of mass destruction, and achieving fair and free trade.
Moreover, the Legal Advisers recognized that when a State elects to
ignore or reinterpret an existing international rule according to its own
short-term interests, it runs the risk of being unable to invoke the rule in
the future, to its ultimate detriment.

72
73

Bolton, supra note 1, at 48.
As former Acting Legal Adviser Michael Matheson explained:
I agree that the use-of-force cases are rather unusual situations where typically
Presidents make decisions on the basis of what they consider to be overwhelming
national security needs. And I agree on the other hand, that Presidents and other
foreign policy decision-makers are perfectly willing to accept that they are more
constrained in other areas by international law norms. This is certainly true in
economic affairs and other situations where there are treaty obligations, such as
environmental obligations. So there really is a spectrum in which perhaps only on the
extreme end of the spectrum does international law always win the day, but even on
other parts of the spectrum, international law is a definite constraint on policy makers.
Michael Matheson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference of Former Legal Advisers at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (Apr. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Day-Long Conference], in
SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 14.
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Are international legal rules ever clear enough to constrain policy
preferences?

The Legal Advisers all stressed that the vagueness of many areas
of international law provided States with a great deal of latitude in
foreign affairs. This was seen to be equally true with respect to treaty
provisions and unwritten customary international law. Further, as
political appointees (as opposed to career civil servants or foreign
service officers), most of the Legal Advisers acknowledged that where
international law is unsettled or legitimately open to differing
interpretations, they would naturally favor the interpretation most
consonant with the course of action advocated by policy-makers.
Moreover, the Legal Advisers suggested that to maintain their clout
within the Department it was important for L to be seen as trying to find
a solution for every difficulty rather than a difficulty for every solution.
As an example of such creativity, David Andrews described the
catalogue of justifications L crafted for the 1999 NATO intervention to
halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo as “putting new wine into old bottles.”74
Historically, the United States government has never taken the
position that international law is not binding upon it (though some Bush
Administration officials came close in opining that the Geneva
Conventions were outmoded in an age of global terrorism75). Nor has
the United States ever openly admitted that it has breached international
law, preferring instead to cloak what others view as transgressions in
the rhetoric of permissible interpretations or exceptions. There was a
limit, however, to how far the Legal Advisers were willing to push the
bounds of interpretation to circumvent the law.
Under the international law principle of reciprocity, “what’s good
for the goose is good for the gander,” meaning that other States can use
American arguments to justify their actions when roles are reversed.
While Goldsmith and Posner focus solely on bilateral reciprocity, the
Legal Advisers suggested that “multilateral” or “systemic” reciprocity is
also of concern.76 If the United States ignores or interprets away a rule
of international law, the precedent will be used by other States in the
international community, both with respect to their relations with the
United States and with each other, thereby weakening the general rule

74
75

Id., ch. 17.
E.g., Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to U.S. President
George W. Bush, Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the
Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum],
available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70952/00173_020125_001display.pdf.
76 For a detailed explanation of the concept of “systemic reciprocity,” see MARK OSIEL, THE
END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE LAW OF WAR 368 (2009).
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of law and rendering the international system less stable. As an
example, in 2008, Russia cited the precedent of the 1999 NATO
bombing campaign in Serbia to halt ethnic cleansing as its legal
rationale for invading the Republic of Georgia to halt violence against
ethnic Russians in the province of South Ossetia.77
3.

Does the Legal Adviser have a duty to oppose proposed actions
that conflict with international law?

One school of thought is that it is not the Legal Adviser’s job to
render “impartial” advice, any more than a corporate lawyer is expected
to do so. The Government wants its international lawyer to promote
rather than judge the aims of the administration.78 A competing school
maintains that the Legal Adviser has a special or higher professional
responsibility to provide a disinterested assessment because his advice
is not normally tested in courts of law or by other outside checks.79 The
following colloquy in answer to the query, “Who did you perceive as
your client?,” sheds light on the answer to the question of whether the
Legal Adviser has a duty to oppose proposed actions that would clearly
violate international law:
Abe Sofaer [Reagan and Bush Administrations]: [O]ne example
of an instance in my career at L where this issue of who is the client
arose very dramatically was during the Iran-Contra episode. I was
working to try to stop the lies that were going on—the stonewalling
that was going on in the Reagan administration about IranContra. . . . And Schultz was led at a meeting to ask me point-blank
the question you just asked. He said, “Who do you represent,
Sofaer? Are you my lawyer? Whose lawyer are you?”
And I said, “I am the lawyer of the President of the United States.
He’s my client and through him, the people of the United States and
the Congress of the United States. . . .”
Davis Robinson [Reagan Administration]: I think it’s a very
fundamental question—and of course, if you’re going to survive as
Legal Adviser, the Secretary of State had better also be your client—
internally, again, within the department. . . . The Legal Adviser’s
office for many years was viewed in the government at large as the
moral conscience of American foreign policy. That may be a
grandiose view of one’s role, but it was impressed upon me that the
Legal Adviser has got to see to the observation of all of the
77 JIM NICHOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RUSSIA-GEORGIA CONFLICT IN SOUTH OSSETIA:
CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS 18 (Sept. 22, 2008), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110841.pdf.
78 Gerald Fitzmaurice, Legal Advisers and Foreign Affairs, 59 AM. J. INT’L L. 72, 73 (1965).
79 John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in
Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992) (book review).
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international agreements, the treaties, the customary international
law—and so, the client is certainly the President. I would agree with
Abe that if there is a conflict between the President and the Secretary
of State—and that does indeed occur (and having been the Legal
Adviser to Alexander Haig, I can assure you that it occurred with
some frequency . . .)—you’d better then cast your lot with the
President. But then you’ve also got a duty to the Senate, which
confirmed you. You’ve got a duty to the public. It’s an extremely
difficult question to answer and one that Legal Advisers should lose
sleep over—and I think that probably every single one of us did on
occasion.
Conrad Harper [Clinton Administration]: . . . On a work-a-day
basis, plainly the Secretary of State is the client. In the event of a
fundamental disagreement between the Secretary and the Legal
Adviser, then of course the Legal Adviser’s allegiance must go to the
President. In the event of a fundamental disagreement with the
President, then there is always of course the possibility of resignation
on the one hand, but on the other there is the notion that there may be
obligations to the Senate as the representative of the sovereignty—
because, of course, in our system the sovereignty is with the people.
Edwin Williamson [Bush Administration]: I really beg to differ. I
think your client is the State Department, and the person ultimately
with the decision is the Secretary of State. Perhaps through the
Secretary you serve the President, but I emphasize that [is] through
the [S]ecretary . . . .
Michael Matheson [Bush and Clinton Administrations]: I don’t
think it’s useful to think of this in terms of lawyer/client
relationships. I think that lawyers in public service are public
officials and they have responsibilities parallel to those [that] other
public officials have. An intelligence officer has a duty to give the
best reading of the facts in a situation that he can, regardless of what
his clients (if you want to call them that) want to hear. It’s the same
for a lawyer. He has a duty to give honest legal advice and not to
change it based upon what the client may expect or desire. So I
would say that in that sense, a government lawyer has a duty to the
entire body of the public even though he obviously has direct
working relationships with a hierarchy in his own agency.
Conrad Harper [Clinton Administration]: . . . Herb Wexler was
very troubled by the fact that he knew, having worked in the War
Department and then the Justice Department, that there had been
misrepresentation at a fundamental level in the Japanese relocation
cases. And for many, many years his view was that he could not
speak because of the duty of confidentiality in the attorney-client
privilege. But there came a time when he believed that the claims of
history and justice required that he come forth—and that’s what I
have in mind. At some point, depending on how serious the case is,
one’s obligations may run in fact to the sovereignty.
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Herb Hansel [Carter Administration]: I think that Mike Matheson
has it right. To me, a number of different strains run through this
question: who is the employer, to whom do you owe a duty[] of
loyalty—but in the end, if there are disagreements up and down the
line, the public interest is in the mind of the lawyer, and this applies
to all lawyers that serve the public, not just at the State Department
and not just the Legal Adviser. Clearly the ultimate decision has to
be what’s in the best interest of the public. It’s important to keep in
mind, as has already been said, that in 99.9% of the daily tasks, it’s
the Secretary of State or other officers of the Department for whom
the Legal Adviser works; but ultimately it’s the body of the public.
David Andrews [Clinton Administration]: . . . I [have to] agree
with Ed . . . I [understood] my responsibilities were to the Secretary
of . . . State and through her to the President. And for issues such as
Conrad [Harper] mentions, those are the kinds of issues where
resignation is the right path. If you have privilege and confidentiality
problems, then you obviously do what Mr. Wexler did; but I think
that if you feel a duty to resign, then it arises from the obligation to
the people.80

When consulted at an early stage, the Legal Advisers saw their
initial responsibility as providing a candid opinion of what the legal
situation was, as well as spelling out the possible consequences for
violating international law in the particular area and advocating policy
choices that would not violate international law. Later, most of the
Legal Advisers seemed quite comfortable to switch hats and play the
role of advocate for the U.S. position, defending the decision made by
policy-makers, even if the Legal Adviser personally thought it was at
odds with international law. As Michael Matheson put it, “The Legal
Adviser gives legal advice before decisions are made; he gives the best
possible legal defense for the decision once it has been made; and he
contributes to solving practical problems with his lawyering skills.”81
Even as national advocates, however, the Legal Advisers indicated that
they sought to shape their arguments with an eye to interpreting rules in
the manner most beneficial to the long-term and broad national
interest.82

80
81

Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 14.
Michael Matheson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.
82 In discussing the rationale L articulated for the Kosovo intervention, Michael Matheson
concluded:
[W]hat this all illustrates is that although L doesn’t really ever make a decision as to
whether to use force or not; nonetheless, it does have a significant impact on how the
decision is articulated, and that can be important in terms of what precedents are or are
not created for the future. At the time, the concern was that if we articulated the broad
self-defense or the humanitarian intervention rationale, it might be misused by others.
Id. ch. 11.
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How influential is the advice of the Legal Adviser?

There were times in each of the Legal Advisers’ tenure where they
advised against a course of action that they perceived to be in violation
of international law. The clarity of a given international legal standard
affected the degree to which each Legal Adviser was inclined to take
such a position or how strongly to advocate it. Thus, the factors the
Legal Advisers said they take into account in deciding whether to opine
that a proposed course of action would violate international law include:
the extent to which the relevant rules of international law are
unambiguous, well established, and broadly accepted; as well as the
extent to which an international or domestic forum exists that can
pronounce judgment on the correctness of the administration’s
interpretation of the law in question. The Legal Advisers recognized,
moreover, that the ability to claim that an act is not in violation of
international law is limited by the credulity of both the domestic and
international legal communities, as reflected in the public statements of
governments, NGOs, international organizations, and scholars.
Generally speaking, policy-makers tended to accord substantial
weight to L’s legal opinions. The Legal Advisers mentioned several
instances, including some cases involving questions of use of force,
where policy-makers reluctantly heeded their legal advice despite policy
preferences to the contrary.83 Roberts Owen, for example, related the
story of how in the middle of the Iranian hostage crisis, the policymakers decided not to use force against the Iranian embassy in
Washington because “Secretary Vance was a good law-abiding lawyer
and, based on L’s advice, he concluded that Iran’s wrongdoing wouldn’t
justify wrongdoing by the United States.”84
Abe Sofaer recalled how he successfully convinced the policymakers not to attack Libya after it was disclosed that Libya had
provided confiscated Tunisian passports to the terrorists that attacked
airline passengers at the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985, because the
United States had not yet publicly articulated its position that States that
support terrorists would be subject to attack, and because it “had not
fully exhausted non-forcible options.”85 In another case that same year,
83 As Abe Sofaer remarked: “I’m sure each one of us at one point or another has advised our
clients not to use force in a situation and our advice was taken. Certainly it happened for me at
least twice, and once at the very highest level imaginable.” Abe Sofaer, Remarks at Day-Long
Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 14.
84 Roberts Owen, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS,
supra note 10, ch. 17.
85 Abe Sofaer, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS,
supra note 10, ch. 17. After such a warning had been issued and peaceful means exhausted,
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Sofaer described how, following L’s advice, President Reagan ordered
U.S. fighter jets to divert an Egyptian airliner carrying the terrorist
mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking to a NATO base in Italy, but
“did not authorize the use of force in the event it did not comply.”86
Further, because the agreement governing the base precluded any nonNATO operation without Italy’s consent, L advised and the President
reluctantly agreed that “we had no legal alternative to turning over the
terrorists” to the Italian authorities rather than seeking to transport them
to the United States for prosecution.87
Conrad Harper, in turn, recounted:
While I was Legal Adviser during the spring of 1994, the United
States agreed to supply the Peruvian Air Force with real-time
intelligence, which ultimately resulted in the Peruvian Air Force
mistakenly shooting down a civilian aircraft. My office informed the
policy makers that this policy could not sustain itself under the
Chicago Convention, and the practice was thereafter reluctantly
discontinued.88

The importance of these incidents is manifest, for until now,
scholars such as Goldsmith and Posner could only attempt to ascertain
the role that international law played by examining the overt actions of
the United States. The meeting of former Legal Advisers disclosed for
the first time several instances in which policy-makers decided to
forego the use of force as an option based on arguments that such action
under the circumstances would violate international law.
In a particularly telling episode related by John Bellinger, L
convinced the White House to issue a Presidential Memorandum to
implement the International Court of Justice’s decision in the
Avena/Medellin case. The memo exhorted state courts to give effect to
the ICJ’s judgment that a new trial was necessary because the Texas
authorities had not apprised the Mexican defendant of his right to
consult a consular officer at the time of arrest as required by the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. According to Bellinger:
[T]he significance of President Bush’s decision cannot be overstated,
given that the President was the former Governor of Texas and a
supporter of the death penalty and that Mr. Medellin had been
convicted of an especially grisly crime in Texas—the rape and
murder of two teenage girls. Ordering review of his conviction and
sentence in order to comply with a decision by an international

however, with Sofaer’s full support, the United States did launch an airstrike against Libya in
response to Libyan involvement in the 1986 LaBelle Disco bombing in Germany, in which
several U.S. service members were killed. Id. ch. 7.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Conrad Harper, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.
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tribunal in The Hague was not a popular decision in Texas.89

Although the strategy ultimately failed when the Supreme Court ruled
that without federal legislation the President did not have the authority
to implement a non-self-executing treaty and override the Tenth
Amendment rights of Texas,90 it is significant that the Bush
Administration argued tenaciously in its briefs and during oral argument
for enforcement of the ICJ judgment.
At other times, L was influential in shaping the modalities and
articulating the rationale for use of force so that it would be accepted by
the international community. As Michael Matheson explains:
I don’t think it’s realistic to think Presidents are often going to
refrain from the use of force on what they consider to be essential
security grounds because of the views of the Legal Adviser. On the
other hand, I think there are important things that Legal Advisers can
do with respect to the use of force. One is to see to it that the
modalities used are as consistent with international law as possible.
For example, the actions we took in Nicaragua, which were
gratuitously in violation of international law need not necessarily
have been so. Another aspect is that when the decision is made to
use force, it’s important what argument is made to justify that
decision. There are some ways of justifying which will open up
entirely new open-ended doctrines. There are others which are more
consistent with past practices; the Legal Adviser can have a
considerable amount of influence on what arguments are made,
which in turn greatly influences what precedential effect that use of
force might have.91

Davis Robinson described the 1983 “rescue mission” in Grenada as
an example of this:
In our legal justification, we consciously avoided argument that
might imply any weakening in the legal restraints that apply to the
use of force. For example, we did not claim that we were exercising
an inherent right of self-defense under the United Nations Charter.
Furthermore, we did not assert any broad doctrine of humanitarian
intervention.92

At the same time, the Legal Advisers recognized that L was not the
government’s leading voice on all matters of international law. This
means that a study of the government’s perception of international law
that uses L as its focus has value but does not tell the whole story since
89 Supplement to Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note
10, ch. 17, E-mail Exchange between John Bellinger, Legal Adviser to President George W.
Bush, and author (2009) (on file with author).
90 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
91 Michael Matheson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 14.
92 Davis Robinson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.
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legal offices within other government departments and agencies,
including the Pentagon, the Commerce Department, the CIA, and the
Department of Justice, have preeminence in certain areas of
international law within their unique experience and expertise. As Abe
Sofaer observed, “The fact of the matter is that American foreign policy
has shifted from the State Department . . . to other agencies. As foreign
policies become more specialized . . . [other agencies] have the lead in
many international issues.”93
Where a significant international law-related issue came within the
special purview of these other legal offices, the State Department
lawyers were expected to work with their counterparts (and vice versa)
through a “clearance process” in an attempt to ensure that a single legal
position would emerge. Where this proved not to be possible, divergent
legal opinions would ordinarily be presented to the President and
Cabinet within the text of a decision memo. To maximize their legal
influence, State Department Legal Advisers found that they had to be
much more than gifted lawyers and administrators; they also had to be
skillful and sometimes aggressive bureaucrats, unafraid to tackle the
internecine turf battles that were inherent in the inter-agency process.
Often the most important battle was simply to ensure that L had a
proverbial “seat at the table.”
The Legal Advisers pointed out that the internal clearance
procedure did not always operate in this prescribed manner, and on a
handful of notable occasions L was intentionally kept out of the
decision-making process, even on matters that turned entirely on
interpretation of international law. This tended to happen when State
Department officials from other bureaus or government officials from
other departments or agencies foresaw that L would likely oppose a
proposed course of action. As Davis Robinson put it: “Some policy
makers will on occasion assume the following attitude: ‘Oh, let’s not
involve L. First, they are likely to say no. Second, they will take
forever—they are so slow. And, if you’re not careful, once they get
involved, they will run away with your store.’”94 The Legal Advisers
mentioned the following cases in which L was cut out of the decisionmaking process: the 1980s mining of Nicaraguan harbors95 and armed

93 Abe Sofaer, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS,
supra note 10, ch. 14.
94 Davis Robinson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.
95 Id. ch. 14 (“That was a contrast with the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors where I’m sorry
to say we knew absolutely nothing in advance. . . . [W]hen it comes to use of force . . . over the
years, there’s been a lot [of] skepticism about including the lawyers—for example in planning
covert operations. As far as I know, in a covert operation international law still applies, so if
someone’s going to undertake some secret operation involving the use of force, it’s better to have
the legal argument in place before undertaking it.”).
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support for the “contras,”96 the 1990 kidnapping of Dr. AlvarezMachain from Mexico,97 and the adoption of policies related to the
treatment of “unlawful enemy combatants” detained in the aftermath of
the attacks of September 11, 2001.98
The same policy-makers that cut L out of the decision-making
process, however, display no hesitancy in seeking L’s assistance in
crafting after-the-fact legal justifications for the decisions and actions
taken. No matter his own opinion on the matter, the Legal Adviser is
then asked to become advocate for the U.S. position.99 As Stephen
Schwebel, a former Deputy Legal Adviser who later served as President
of the International Court of Justice, once remarked: “The [Legal
Adviser] is always called in to pick up the pieces even if he was not
influentially involved in the initial decision . . . .”100 Thus, in relation to
the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors, former Legal Adviser Davis
Robinson said:
As it turned out, all that the lawyers could contribute was assistance
in after-the-fact containment of a train wreck. I remember one
Secretary of State under whom I served stating, “I have only one
rigid rule and that is, don’t ever let me be blind-sided.” I can only
have wished that this sensible rule had applied to L as well.101

During a roundtable discussion with foreign Legal Advisers,
former U.K. Legal Adviser Sir Franklin Berman offered a comparative
perspective on this problem:
Probably the most notorious incident where the U.K. Legal Adviser
was deliberately cut out of the loop was the ‘56 Suez invasion. But I
would say that the lessons of that experience have generally been

96 Abe Sofaer, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS,
supra note 10, ch. 7.
97 See id. (“The Alvarez-Machain case is another example . . . [of] the strong correlation
between disastrous policies and failure to consult in advance with the international lawyers. In
the Alvarez-Machain case, not only was the Legal Adviser’s office not consulted, but the Justice
Department didn’t even consult the White House. They went ahead and seized this doctor from
Mexico in a secret operation and brought him to the United States, took the case all the way up
[to] the Supreme Court, and then lost the trial. It had a negative [e]ffect on our foreign policy,
and several countries required that we provide assurances that we would not kidnap citizens from
their territory.”).
98 SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 16.
99 Abe Sofaer recalled that he “privately recommended that the President adhere to the
narrower interpretation of the [ABM] treaty” until the Senate consented to a broader
interpretation that would not prevent the testing and development of President Reagan’s proposed
Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as Star Wars). Abe Sofaer, Remarks at Day-Long
Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 7. Sofaer’s view was
firmly conveyed and firmly rejected. Id. Sofaer was then left with the “futile” task of articulating
the legal rationale for unilateral Executive Branch implementation of the new interpretation. Id.
100 Stephen M. Schwebel, Remarks on the Role of the Legal Adviser of the US State
Department, 2-1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 132, 134 (1991).
101 Davis Robinson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.
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learned for the future. It is considered a cardinal sin within the U.K.
Foreign Office to put up a policy submission that did not clearly
recite that the Legal Adviser or his staff had been consulted, or
which did not include an analysis of the legal questions which were
relevant to the decision. If the submission did not contain this, then
any legitimate senior official or minister would send it back for a
complete analysis to know what the law stated.102

The former U.S. State Department Legal Advisers concluded that
the United States would do well to adopt a similar iron-clad procedural
requirement. As Davis Robinson summed up:
The main lesson that I drew from my days in L is that, if the United
States Government is to realize the full benefit of the potential
contribution of its international lawyers, the lawyers need to
participate from the beginning of a take-off in policy and not just in a
crash landing whenever things go wrong.103

Interestingly, none of the Legal Advisers said they ever seriously
considered resigning from office when their legal advice was not
heeded or when they were cut out of the loop, though all agreed that
resignation might be necessary in an extreme case. In particular, the
Legal Advisers discussed the case of U.K. Deputy Legal Adviser
Elizabeth Wilmshurst, who resigned when the U.K. government decided
to disregard her legal memo opining that the proposed 2003 invasion of
Iraq was not lawful.104 Conrad Harper remarked, “To be an effective
Legal Adviser or Deputy Legal Adviser, one must recognize that the
exit door must always be open. When there is a very important matter
and the government refuses to follow advice that you consider to be
essential, you are suppose[d] to resign.”105 In this regard, Roberts Owen
related the story of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s resignation to
protest the Iranian hostage rescue mission that was launched over his
opposition.106
5.

Do the Legal Advisers view international law as helpful or a
hindrance?

No matter whether a particular Legal Adviser leaned more toward
constructivist or political realist, they all embraced international law as
102
103

SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 15.
Davis Robinson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.
104 For background on Wilmshurst’s resignation, see Paul Eastham, Iraq: Is This the Smoking
Gun?, DAILY MAIL (London), Mar. 25, 2005, at 6.
105 Conrad Harper, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.
106 SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.
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a tool for achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. For, as Professor Louis
Henkin has written, “‘[r]ealists’ who do not recognize the uses and the
force of law are not realistic.”107 At the same time, this author would
add that constructivists who would approach international law as a
straight jacket that precludes innovative interpretation are not
constructive.
The Legal Advisers shared a number of instances where creative
interpretation and use of international law furthered U.S. foreign policy
aims and avoided the necessity of using force. These include L’s lead
role in establishing the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal which was part of the
deal for the release of U.S. hostages, and the Iraqi Compensation
Commission and Boundary Dispute Commission which were part of the
cease fire agreement in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.108
In this regard, David Andrews detailed the role L played in
negotiating the several international agreements and Security Council
Resolutions that made it possible to try the two Libyan officials charged
with blowing up Pan Am 103 before a special Scottish Court sitting in
The Netherlands. This creative solution severed a thirty-year cycle of
violence between the United States and Libya and facilitated the
transformation of Libya from a terrorist-supporting State to a partner in
the war against terrorism.109
Michael Matheson, in turn, recounted L’s pivotal role in the
creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, the first international war crimes tribunal since
Nuremberg.110 It was L that came up with the idea of having the
Security Council create the tribunal under its Chapter VII powers rather
than seek to negotiate a treaty (as the Europeans had proposed) that
would take a great deal more time and might yield unpredictable results.
The Security Council had never before been used to establish a judicial
body, but L succeeded in convincing the other members of the Council
that such action was legitimate and would yield a better result than the
treaty route.111 The launch of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal in
107
108

HENKIN, supra note 8, at 337.
Matheson explained:
The amounts claimed totaled well over $200 million, and it was clear that the usual
method by which such international claims problems are resolved (a formal case-bycase adjudication process in the adversarial mode, like the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal)
would be wholly inadequate to deal with the problems presented here. So instead, the
Legal Adviser’s office proposed and ultimately the Security Council agreed to an
innovative system, which had a number of new features.
Michael Matheson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS,
supra note 10, ch. 9.
109 SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 11.
110 Id. ch. 9.
111 Conrad Harper adds:
Now there was something masquerading as something old that was in fact
revolutionary—and the genius of it was that we were able to convince the world that it
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1993 led to the Security Council’s creation of the Rwanda Tribunal a
year later and ultimately paved the way to the establishment of a
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) four years after that.
B.

Just a Matter of Semantics?

‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone,
‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so
many different things.’
—Lewis Caroll112

If Goldsmith and Posner and other neo-realists and rationalists
recognize that international legal rules exert influence on State behavior
(through concern about negative publicity, diminution of reputation,
reduced international cooperation, and retaliation),113 and that as a
consequence States usually act in accordance with customary
international law and treaty law,114 then what difference does it make if
international law is labeled “binding” law or not? Why the focus on
whether or not government officials should perceive a “moral”
obligation to comply with international law? In light of Goldsmith and
Posner’s self-identified “instrumentalist” mind set, another way to put
this question is: What are they trying to accomplish by seeking to prove
that international law is not real law? And, in semiotic terms, who are
they seeking to influence and why?
A recent essay in The American Interest by Nicholas Rostow, who
served as Chief Counsel of the NSC during the administration of
George H.W. Bush and subsequently as Legal Adviser of the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations during the administration of George W.
Bush, points to the answer to this question. According to Rostow:
[C]riticism of the United States on international law grounds is
especially notable because of the very nature of the United States as
was just what everyone had always understood should be the case. While we were
operating under Chapter 7, and the Security Council had created the tribunal,
nonetheless people talked about Nuremberg and Tokyo and the post WWI war crimes
efforts as if they were the lineal ancestry of the Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal—when
in fact of course this tribunal was something that the world had never seen before.
Now, having done it once we’ve done it again and it really is old.
Conrad Harper, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra
note 10, ch. 14.
112 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE
(1871), in THE ANNOTATED ALICE: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 213 (Martin Gardner ed., 2000)
(emphases omitted).
113 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 90.
114 Id. at 165.
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a country: the United States is defined by law. Its oaths of
citizenship and office holding are pledges to the Constitution, not to
a flag, not to a territory, not to the mother- or fatherland, and, of
course, not to a sovereign. The law defines who an American is, and
it binds each of us to every other.
That is part of the reason why the United States cannot long
sustain foreign policies at odds with international law: In the end,
Americans will not support them. The American people ask “Is it
legal?” before they ask any other question about foreign policy
actions short of self-defense against direct aggression.115

Rostow’s observation suggests that as long as policy-makers,
bureaucrats, and the general public believe that compliance with
international law is important, this belief will have a significant impact
on State decision-making.
In his 2007 memoir, The Terror Presidency, Goldsmith identifies
himself as “part of a group of conservative intellectuals—dubbed ‘new
sovereigntists’ in Foreign Affairs magazine—who were skeptical about
the creeping influence of international law on American law.”116
Goldsmith recounts how when he advised White House Chief Counsel
Alberto Gonzales that “[t]he President can also ignore the law, and act
extralegally,” citing “honorable precedents, going back to the founding
of the nation, of defying legal restrictions in time[s] of crisis,” Gonzales
looked at him as if he were crazy.117 Goldsmith offers the following
explanation for the Attorney General’s reaction:
The post-Watergate hyper-legalization of warfare, and the attendant
proliferation of criminal investigators, had become so ingrained and
threatening that the very idea of acting extralegally was simply off
the table, even in times of crisis. The President had to do what he
had to do to protect the country. And the lawyers had to find some
way to make what he did legal.118

Distaining the perceived hypocrisy enshrined in the Bush
Administration’s approach, in The Limits of International Law,
Goldsmith and Posner have sought to put the idea of openly defying
international law back on the table, by convincing policy-makers,
bureaucrats, and the American public that international law is not real
115 Nicholas Rostow, Law Abiding: Restoring America’s Global Reputation, AM. INTEREST,
Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 81, 81.
116 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 21. Goldsmith states:
My academic objections to this trend were based on the need for democratic control
over the norms that governed American conduct. My scholarship argued against the
judicial activism that gave birth to international human rights lawsuits in U.S. courts.
It decried developments in “customary international law” that purported to bind the
United States to international rules to which the nation’s political leaders had not
consented.
Id.
117 Id. at 80.
118 Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
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law but merely “a special kind of politics”119 that can be ignored
whenever government officials believe it is in the national interest to do
so. Understood in this light, The Limits of International Law is not
really a descriptive account of how international law actually works, but
an effort to alter public perceptions about the importance of
international law in order to expand presidential power in foreign
relations.120
Goldsmith and Posner are not, however, merely tilting at
windmills, and their work is unlikely to be the “Alamo” of the realist
school, as one commentator colorfully suggested.121 Rather, their
venture must be viewed in the context of recognition of the power of
tactical words and phrases to fundamentally alter popular attitudes and
perceptions. The leading expert in this area today is Frank Luntz, a
Republican political consultant, Fox News pundit, and author of The
Luntz Republican Playbook, a strategy memo that has been widely
employed by Republican political candidates.122 In 1994, Luntz found
through focus group research that “death tax” kindled voter resentment
in a way that the phrases “inheritance tax” and “estate tax” did not. He
shared his findings with Republican leaders, who included the new
formulation in the GOP’s “Contract with America.” Soon the term
“death tax” began to appear in news shows and newspaper articles, and
was even included in the title of the legislation that ultimately repealed
the estate tax, the “Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000.” In the years
since then, Luntz has spearheaded the Republican effort to frame the
debate on dozens of other salient political issues through the creative
use of language. Examples of this include changing the phrases “oil
drilling” to “energy exploration,” “tax cuts” to “tax relief,”
“undocumented workers” to “illegal aliens,” “private school vouchers”
to “parental choice,” “global warming” to “climate change,” “late-term
abortion” to “partial-birth abortion,” “healthcare reform” to
“government takeover of healthcare,” and perhaps most relevant to our
discussion, renaming the effort to suppress terrorism the “Global War
on Terror,” dubbing “kidnapping” “extraordinary rendition,” referring
to “detainees” as “unlawful enemy combatants,” and calling “torture”
“enhanced interrogation.”123
119
120
121
122

GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 202.
McGuinness, supra note 57, at 421.
Spiro, supra note 60, at 446.
An excerpt of the Frank Luntz Republican Playbook, “Appendix: The 14 Words Never to
Use,” was leaked and posted on the internet at http://www.politicalstrategy.org/archives/
001208.php.
123 See Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 38,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/17/magazine/17DEMOCRATS.html; see also
FRANK LUNTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF HEALTHCARE 2009 (2009), available at
http://wonkroom.thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/frank-luntz-the-language-ofhealthcare-20091.pdf; Evan R. Goldstein, Who Framed George Lakoff?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
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Over the years, Democratic politicians and liberal commentators
have practiced these word games as well, though less frequently and
with less success. They have, for example, altered the moniker “proabortion” to “pro-choice” in the 1970s and re-branded Ronald Reagan’s
missile defense initiative “Star Wars” in the 1980s. Luntz’s counterpart
on the Democratic side is Professor George Lakoff of U.C. Berkely,
best-selling author of Don’t Think of an Elephant and founder of a
political consulting firm known as the Rockridge Institute.124 Lakoff
has convinced the Democratic leadership that Republican success has
been in part due to skilled use of loaded language, along with constant
repetition, enabling the phrases to enter the everyday lexicon and
thereby bias the debate in favor of conservatives. Following Lakoff’s
advice, in the 2008 national elections, Democrats began referring to
themselves as “progressives” instead of “liberals,” labeled the Bush
Administration’s Iraq strategy “escalation” instead of “surge,” and
called “deficit spending” “economic stimulus.”125
In the context of international law and foreign policy, the
importance of labeling can be clearly demonstrated with respect to the
development and use of the euphemistic term “ethnic cleansing” as an
alternative for “genocide.” Although the Genocide Convention does not
generally require countries to take action to halt genocide outside their
borders,126 governments have found that the term “genocide,” with its
roots in the Holocaust, has a unique power to create often irresistible
public pressure on a government to act. Consequently, in order to
preserve their options or excuse inaction, governments prefer to instead
employ the term “ethnic cleansing” to describe mass atrocities.
While the term “ethnic cleansing” is frequently attributed as a
linguistic creation of Serb leaders in 1992 to describe their policy of
ridding parts of Bosnia of Muslims, in fact the term was an invention of
journalists and it was propagated first by the United States and then by
the United Nations. In March 1993, the State Department Office of the
Legal Adviser prepared a memorandum for the Secretary of State,
opining that the information in the government’s possession was
sufficient to legally conclude that a one-sided, well-organized campaign
of genocide was taking place in Bosnia, but Secretary of State Warren
Christopher nevertheless refused to use the “G-word.”127 When asked
Aug. 15, 2008, at B6, available at http://www.chronicle.com/free/v54/i49/49b00601.htm.
124 Bai, supra note 123.
125 See id.; Wayne Slater, Democrats Realizing the War That Wins Votes Is One of Words,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 20, 2007, at A3.
126 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.
127 Michael P. Scharf & Colin T. McLaughlin, On Terrorism and Whistleblowing, 38 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 567, 569 (2006-07).
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while testifying before Congress, “Doesn’t ethnic cleansing qualify as
genocide?,” Secretary Christopher answered in the negative, insisting
that “all sides had committed atrocities” and that Bosnia was essentially
an “ethnic feud” and therefore “somewhat different from the
Holocaust.”128
In response, several mid-level State Department officials took the
extraordinary step of resigning to protest the Secretary of State’s
intentional obfuscation of the truth about the Bosnian atrocities, whose
purpose was to allow the Administration to maintain that there was no
moral or legal imperative for U.S. military intervention in Bosnia.129
Conrad Harper, the Legal Adviser at the time, recalls:
In my view they were genocides. But there were a lot of policy
concerns about being that blunt, including what obligation we had
under the Genocide Convention to act—so it was a tap dance. But I
never had any doubt in my own mind, and I made it clear that was
my view. But the Legal Adviser doesn’t make the ultimate
decisions, even about characterizing something as an international
crime.130

A year later, while 800,000 Tutsis were being massacred by Hutus
in Rwanda, the U.S. State Department similarly engaged in what
genocide chronicler Samantha Power later characterized as “a twomonth dance to avoid the [G]-word.”131 A subsequently leaked
Pentagon discussion paper on the unfolding crisis in Rwanda revealed
the purpose behind this strategy, warning that a “Genocide finding
could commit [the U.S. government] to actually ‘do something.’”132
Consistent with this, in a comprehensive study covering 1990-2005,
which was published in the European Journal of Public Health,
researches found that the term “ethnic cleansing” was frequently used
by government officials and U.N. bodies instead of “genocide” to
downplay urgency, “leading to inaction in preventing current and future

128 Id.; see also Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Goal on Bosnia: Keeping War Within Borders, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1993, at A10.
129 The resigning officials included George Kenney, Deputy head of the Bosnia Desk;
Marshall Harris, head of the Bosnia Desk; Jon Western of the Intelligence and Research Bureau;
and Steven Walker, the head of the Croatian Desk. See Norman Kempster, 4th U.S. Aide Quits
over Balkan Policy, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 24, 1993, at 10. One of the officials who resigned,
Marshall Harris, told the press, “It’s genocide and the [S]ecretary of [S]tate won’t identify it as
such. That’s where we get beyond the political to the moral.” Daniel Williams, A Third State
Dept. Official Resigns over Balkan Policy, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1993, at A1.
130 Conrad Harper, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 10
131 SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 359
(Perennial 2003).
132 Joanne Mariner, Talking About Darfur: Is Genocide Just a Word?, COUNTERPUNCH, Sept.
15, 2004 (alteration in original), available at http://www.counterpunch.org/mariner09152004
.html.
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genocides.”133 Concluding that “[t]he term ‘ethnic cleansing’ corrupts
observation, interpretation, ethical judgment and decision-making,” the
authors of the study argue that the Public Health community “should
lead the way in expunging the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ from official
use.” 134
It turned out that the Pentagon was right to be concerned about the
power of the “G-word,” as the George W. Bush Administration learned
the hard way ten years after the crisis in Rwanda. In June 2004, the
United States Congress and the State Department announced their
determination that the atrocities in Darfur, Sudan amounted to
genocide.135 A year later, when France and the United Kingdom
submitted a Security Council resolution to authorize the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction over the Darfur situation, the Bush Administration realized
that having labeled the atrocities genocide it could not get away with
voting against the resolution despite its opposition to the ICC.136 As a
result, subsequent to abstaining on the resolution, the Bush
Administration found that it could no longer assert that the ICC was an
illegitimate and inherently unfair institution, and because the power of
the Security Council was now on the line, the Administration had to
support efforts to compel the surrender of indicted Sudanese officials to
the ICC.
Echoing the underlying premise of semiotic theory, both Luntz and
Lakoff argue that the most important resource a politician or policymaker has is the way in which people understand the world and
therefore interpret the message. As Luntz puts it, “It’s not what you
say, it’s what people hear.”137 Thus, they advocate “framing”—that is,
choosing the language to define a debate, which is exactly what Posner
and Goldsmith have sought to accomplish through The Limits of
International Law. At the same time that Goldsmith and Posner decline
to acknowledge the ways international law may influence legal
consciousness, by seeking to convince the public that it is no more
“illegal” to contravene international law than it would be to disregard a
non-binding letter of intent,138 “they themselves are nevertheless
attempting to affect legal consciousness in the United States.”139
George Orwell discussed the power of language to alter societal
133 Rony Blum et al., ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ Bleaches the Atrocities of Genocide, 18 EUR. J. PUB.
HEALTH 204, 204 (2008).
134 Id.
135 Mahmood Mamdani, The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency, LONDON
REV. BOOKS, Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n05/mamd01_%20html.
136 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005).
137 FRANK LUNTZ, WORDS THAT WORK: IT’S NOT WHAT YOU SAY, IT’S WHAT PEOPLE
HEAR (2007).
138 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 90; Posner, supra note 4, at 1901.
139 Berman, supra note 65, at 1306.
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conceptions in his famous 1946 essay, Politics and the English
Language,140 and then brought the theory to life in his fictional
masterpiece Nineteen Eighty-Four.141 Particularly prophetic was
Nineteen Eighty-Four’s portrayal of propaganda by labeling and
through re-definition of words. Thus, the “Ministry of Peace” in the
novel actually deals with war, the “Ministry of Love” is in charge of
torturing people, and the mandate of the “Ministry of Truth” is to revise
historical records to match the government’s version of the past and to
develop “Newspeak,” the government’s minimalist artificial language
meant to ideologically align thought and action with the aims of the
government. What Goldsmith and Posner seek to accomplish through
their book is not that different from what Orwell’s fictional government
sought through the use of the Newspeak concept of “blackwhite.”
Orwell described blackwhite as the “loyal willingness to say that black
is white when Party discipline demands this. . . . [I]t means also the
ability to believe that black is white, and more, to know that black is
white, and to forget that one has ever believed the contrary.”142
Most political scientists who seek to discount the influence of
international law tend to avoid even using the term “international law”
or “international obligation,” instead preferring to speak of international
“principles,” “norms,” “standards,” “precepts,” “rules,” and
“procedures.”143 Goldsmith and Posner, in contrast, seek to reverse the
meaning of the term altogether. Thus, under the Goldsmith/Posner
paradigm, whenever one thinks of “binding” international legal
obligations, one is expected to understand the term to actually mean
“non-binding”; whenever one thinks of international “law,” one is
expected to understand the term to really mean international “politics.”
C.

A Modern Case Study: The Torture Memos and International Law

In light of subsequent revelations, it is surprising that Goldsmith
and Posner did not include the case study of the treatment of detainees
in the war on terror in their book, especially since Goldsmith gives a
first-hand account of the decision-making that led to the promulgation
of the Torture Memos in his later book, The Terror Presidency.144
Because it reflects the contemporary state of the international
community and current U.S. perceptions about the role of international
140 4 GEORGE ORWELL, Politics and the English Language (1946), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 127 (Sonia Orwell & Ian
Angus eds., David R. Godine 2000).
141 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
142 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 218 (Plume 2003) (1949).
143 See Koh, supra note 17, at 2625.
144 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 142, 172.
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law, and because there is a concrete paper trail of the legal positions of
the relevant actors, the story of the Torture Memos is in many ways a
better vehicle for examining the binding nature of international law than
the older historic anecdotes that Goldsmith and Posner rely on in their
book. The facts set forth below reflect the unanimous findings of a
bipartisan panel of twenty-five Senators, following extensive hearings
into the matter in the summer and fall of 2008.145 In some cases, these
findings are supplemented by interviews of the principal players
conducted by Professor Philippe Sands,146 the personal recollections of
Jack Goldsmith147 and John Yoo,148 and the commentary of two of the
Legal Advisers interviewed for this project—William Taft and John
Bellinger.
The story begins soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Rather than vet questions
related to the interpretation of international law to the legal departments
of all the relevant agencies, much of the legal work related to the war on
terrorism was done by a self-styled “war council,” composed of White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the Vice President’s Counsel David
Addington, the Pentagon’s Chief Counsel Jim Haynes, and the Deputy
head of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC),
John Yoo, who Goldsmith identifies as a fellow “new sovereigntist.”149
David Addington was reportedly the dominant force among the group,
and one high-level Bush Administration insider recounted that “if you
favored international law, you were in danger of being called ‘soft on
terrorism’ by Addington.”150 Notably absent from the group were the
State Department Legal Adviser, William Taft, and NSC Chief Counsel,
John Bellinger (who would three years later replace Taft as State
Department Legal Adviser). Since OLC had the power to issue
opinions that were binding throughout the executive branch, in
coordination with the war council, John Yoo wrote opinion after
opinion approving every aspect of the Bush Administration’s aggressive
antiterrorism efforts, giving counter-terrorism officials and personnel
“the comfort of knowing that they could not easily be prosecuted later
for the approved actions.”151
145

U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE INQUIRY
TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY (Dec. 11, 2008), available at
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/Detainees.121108.pdf. The full 263-page
report, which was subsequently de-classified and released in May 2009, is available at
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2009/SASC.DetaineeReport.042209.pdf.
146 PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM (2008).
147 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51.
148 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR
(2006).
149 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 21-22.
150 SANDS, supra note 146, at 213.
151 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 23.
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John Yoo believed “[t]he candid approach would be to admit that
our old laws and policies did not address this new enemy [al Qaeda].”152
On January 9, 2002, Yoo authored a key memorandum, providing legal
arguments to support administration officials’ assertions that the
Geneva Conventions did not apply to detainees from the war in
Afghanistan. On January 25, 2002, Gonzales sent a memo (ghostwritten by Addington)153 to President Bush, which opined that the
advice in the January 9th OLC memorandum was sound and that the
President should declare the Taliban and al Qaeda outside the coverage
of the Geneva Conventions. This, Gonzales pointed out, would keep
American interrogators from being exposed to the War Crimes Act, a
1996 law that makes it a federal crime to cause a grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions or a violation of Common Article 3.154 Gonzales’s
memo described the war against terrorism as “a new kind of war” and a
“new paradigm” that showed “Geneva’s strict limitations on
questioning of enemy prisoners” to be “obsolete” and even “quaint.”155
When he learned of the Gonzales memorandum, Secretary of State
Colin Powell quickly prepared a memorandum for the White House,
stating that the advantages of applying the Geneva Conventions to the
Afghan detainees far outweighed those of their rejection.156 Powell said
that declaring the conventions inapplicable would “reverse over a
century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva
[C]onventions and undermine the protections of the law of war for our
troops.”157 He added that it would “undermine public support among
critical allies.”158 An accompanying memorandum prepared by State
Department Legal Adviser William Taft, opined that it is important for
the United States to confirm “that even in a new sort of conflict the
United States bases its conduct on its international treaty obligations
and the rule of law, not just on its policy preferences.”159 Despite
Powell and Taft’s contrary advice, on February 7, the President signed a
memorandum stating that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the
conflict and that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees were not entitled to
152
153

YOO, supra note 148, at 47; see also id. at 22.
Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, The Unseen Path to Cruelty, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, at

A1.
154
155
156

18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 75, at 2.
Memorandum from Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva
Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), reprinted in 37 CASE. W. RES. J.
INT’L. L. 615 app. (2006).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, The Legal Adviser, Department of State, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva
Convention (Feb. 2, 2002), reprinted in 37 CASE. W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 615 app. (2006).
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prisoner of war status or the protections afforded by the Third Geneva
Convention. Although the President’s order stated that as “a matter of
policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees
humanely,” the decision to replace compliance with the Geneva
Conventions with a policy subject to discretionary interpretation, set the
stage for the serious abuses that were to follow.160
A few months later, on August 1, 2002, John Yoo issued two OLC
memos, signed by his boss, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee. The
first, addressed to Gonzales, opined that interrogators could inflict pain
and suffering on detainees up to the level caused by “organ failure”
without violating the domestic and international prohibitions on torture
and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.161 Yoo derived his
definition of torture from a completely unrelated statute that authorized
benefits for emergency health conditions, using the phrase “severe pain”
as a possible indicator of an emergency condition that might cause
serious harm if not immediately treated.162 Yoo’s memo also advised
that, under the doctrine of “necessity,” the President could supersede
national and international laws prohibiting torture. The second OLC
memo, which responded to a request from the CIA, addressed the
legality of specific interrogation tactics, including “waterboarding.”163
Two months later, on October 11, 2002, after meeting with
Gonzales, Addington, and Haynes in Cuba,164 the Commander of
Guantanamo Bay, Major General Michael Dunlavey, sent a memo to
the Pentagon requesting authority to use aggressive interrogation
techniques that were originally designed to simulate abusive tactics used
by our enemies against our own soldiers, including tactics used by the
Communist Chinese to elicit false confessions from U.S. military
personnel. These included “stress positions,” “exploitation of detainee
fears,” “removal of clothing,” “hooding,” “deprivation of light and
sound,” “deprivation of sleep,” and “waterboarding.”165 Dunlavey’s
memo stated that the existing techniques permitted by the Army Field
Manual 34-52 had been exhausted, and that some detainees (in
particular Mohammed al-Qahtani, a Saudi Arabian believed to be the
twentieth 9/11 hijacker) had more information that was vital to U.S.

160
161

U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xiii.
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in 37 CASE. W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 615 app.
(2006).
162 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 145.
163 Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Honorable
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in 37 CASE. W. RES. J.
INT’L. L. 615 app. (2006).
164 SANDS, supra note 146, at 63-64, 137, 222.
165 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xvii.
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national security.166
Given a four-day deadline, and without access to international law
books or databases, Guantanamo’s Staff Judge Advocate Lt. Col. Diane
Beaver wrote an analysis justifying the legality of the techniques. Lt.
Col. Beaver expected that a broader legal review conducted at more
senior levels would follow her own.167 The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers solicited the views of the several
branches of the military. All stated their opposition. The Air Force
cited “serious concerns regarding the legality of many of the proposed
techniques.”168 The Chief of the Army’s International and Operational
Law Division wrote that the techniques “cross[] the line of ‘humane’
treatment,” would “likely be considered maltreatment” under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, and “may violate the torture
statute.”169 The Marine Corps stated that the requested techniques
“arguably violate federal law, and would expose our service members to
possible prosecution.”170
During the meeting of the Legal Advisers, William Taft provided
the following account of the role his Office played during this period:
In the months following the President’s decision, the Legal Adviser’s
Office drafted a lengthy memorandum, which concluded that
because our policy was to treat the al Qaeda and Taliban detainees
consistent with the requirements of the Geneva Conventions, the
question of whether they were entitled to this as a matter of law was
moot. (This draft memorandum was made public by the
Administration in January of 2005.) The draft also expressed the
view that customary international law required that the detainees in
any event be treated humanely and had certain of the rights set out in
the Conventions. We thought that because it was our policy to treat
the detainees consistent with the Conventions, that this was being
done. It developed, however, that at the same time we were working
on our memorandum and subsequently the Department of Justice
lawyers were working separately with the lawyers at the Department
of Defense to authorize certain departures from the Conventions’
terms in the treatment of the detainees, particularly with regard to
methods of interrogation. I and my staff were not invited to review
this work and we were, indeed, unaware that it was being done. . . .
It was highly regrettable that the Legal Adviser’s Office was not
involved in the legal work following the decisions in February 2002.
I think that we were excluded because it was suspected, in light of
some of the positions we had taken, that we would not agree with
some of the conclusions other lawyers in the Administration
166
167
168
169
170

SANDS, supra note 146, at 37.
Id. at 65.
U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xviii.
Id.
Id.
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expected to reach and that we might leak information about the work
to the press. It was somewhat ironic that when the fact of the work
subsequently did become known, it was clear that we at least were
not responsible for this because we had been excluded. I am
convinced, however, that if we had been involved and our views
considered, several conclusions that were not consistent with our
treaty obligations under the Convention [A]gainst Torture (CAT) and
our obligations under customary international law would not have
been reached. Later, in 2004, when we worked with the Department
of Justice on the revision of the memorandum on the CAT that had
been withdrawn earlier in the year, we were able to reach agreement
on a very respectable opinion.171

Having cut out the State Department Office of Legal Adviser, and
ignoring the serious concerns raised by the senior lawyers of the
military services, on November 27, 2002, Jim Haynes, the Pentagon’s
Chief lawyer, and a member of the so-called “war cabinet” who had
been best man at David Addington’s wedding,172 sent a one-page memo
to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, recommending that he approve the
techniques requested by Guantanamo Bay. A few days later, on
December 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld signed Haynes’
recommendation, adding a handwritten note that referred to limits
proposed in the memo on the use of stress positions: “I stand for 8-10
hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?”173 By December 30,
2002, the interrogators at Guantanamo Bay were employing the
extraordinary interrogation techniques (including hooding, removal of
clothing, stress positions, twenty-hour interrogations, and use of dogs)
on Mohammed al-Qahtani and several other detainees.174
A month later, these same techniques were being used at the U.S.
detention center at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, and after the March
2003 invasion of Iraq they migrated to the Abu Ghraib detention
facility.175 In his “insider’s account of the war on terror,” War by Other
Means, John Yoo dismisses the migration theory as “an exercise in
hyperbole and partisan smear.”176 According to the 2008 Senate
bipartisan committee report, however:
The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply
the result of a few soldiers acting on their own. Interrogation
techniques such as stripping detainees of their clothes, placing them
in stress positions, and using military working dogs to intimidate
171 Supplement to Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note
10, ch. 12, E-mail Exchange between William Taft, Legal Adviser to President George W. Bush,
and author (2006) (on file with author).
172 SANDS, supra note 146, at 95.
173 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xix.
174 Id. at xx-xxii.
175 Id. at xxii-xxiii.
176 YOO, supra note 148, at 168.
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them appeared in Iraq only after they had been approved for use in
Afghanistan and at [Guantanamo Bay].177

Between mid-December 2002 and mid-January 2003, Navy
General Counsel Alberto Mora spoke with Haynes three times to
express his concerns about the interrogation techniques at Guantanamo
Bay, opining that they constituted “at a minimum, cruel and inhumane
treatment” that could rise to the level of torture, and “probably will
cause significant harm to our national legal, political, military and
diplomatic interests.”178 He prepared a memo to that effect, which he
threatened to sign unless he heard definitively that the use of the
techniques had been suspended. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld signed
a memo rescinding authority for the techniques on January 15, 2003,
though word of the suspension apparently never got to Afghanistan or
Iraq. That same day, Rumsfeld directed the establishment of a
“Working Group” to review the interrogation techniques, and requested
another legal opinion from OLC in light of the objections that had been
raised.
On March 14, 2003, John Yoo provided an OLC memorandum that
repeated much of what the first Bybee memo had said six months earlier
about the definition of torture. In addition, it stated that interrogators
could not be prosecuted by the Justice Department for using
interrogation methods that would otherwise violate the law. This part of
the opinion can be reduced to the core proposition that, as Richard
Nixon intimated in relation to Watergate, “if the president does it, then
that means it’s legal.”179 The Secretary of Defense rejected the legal
advice of the military services in favor of that provided by Yoo, and on
April 16, 2003, authorized the use of twenty-four specific interrogation
techniques for use at Guantanamo Bay. In addition, the Secretary’s
memo stated: “If, in your view, you require additional interrogation
techniques for a particular detainee, you should provide me, via the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the
proposed technique, recommended safeguards, and the rationale for
applying it with an identified detainee.”180 Rumsfeld subsequently
approved specific requests for hooding, sensory deprivation, and “sleep
adjustment.”181
In his memoir, Goldsmith describes the role he played as head of
OLC from October 2003 to June 2004 in withdrawing the controversial
August 1, 2002 and March 14, 2003 OLC opinions on what constitutes
177
178
179

U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xxiv.
SANDS, supra note 146, at 140.
Cf. Horton, supra note 43 (using the Guantanamo habeas context to examine the Bush
Administration’s departure from well-settled principles of detainees’ rights to counsel and
arguing that such departure amounts to “war on the rule of law itself”).
180 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xxii.
181 Id.
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prohibited acts of torture, and whether the federal torture statute would
apply to military interrogations of “unlawful enemy combatants.”182
When his memoir was published in 2007, Goldsmith was anointed as a
hero by the media for rescinding these Torture Memos and resigning
from OLC rather than compromise his principles—actions which
Newsweek called “a quietly dramatic profile in courage.”183
Paradoxically, Goldsmith acknowledges that he did not rescind
Yoo’s Torture Memos because he thought they had reached the wrong
conclusions, but rather because he thought the memos “rested on
cursory and one-sided legal arguments” and were “legally flawed,
tendentious in substance and tone, and overbroad and thus largely
unnecessary.”184
Indeed, Goldsmith confirms that he believed
extraordinary interrogation techniques can be legally justified in
situations “in which the President believed that exceeding the law was
necessary in an emergency, leaving the torture law intact in the vast
majority of instances.”185 Notably, the 2004 OLC memo that replaced
Yoo’s 2002 work contained a footnote saying that “all interrogation
methods that earlier opinions had found legal were still legal.”186 Yoo
has asserted that Goldsmith’s withdrawal of Yoo’s 2002 opinion was
merely “for appearances’ sake” to divert public criticism in the
immediate aftermath of the Abu Ghraib controversy. “In the real world
of interrogation policy nothing had changed.”187
More significantly, Goldsmith glosses over the tale of his own
“Torture Memo,” a March 19, 2004 OLC memorandum that he
authored and which has been described as a “roadmap to the
outsourcing of torture and other forms of abuse” to Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria.188 He also tries to downplay
182 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 141-76. The Bybee-Yoo memos opined that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to “unlawful combatants,” that obligations under human rights treaties
do not apply to conduct outside of the territory of the United States, and that the Torture
Convention prohibited only the most extreme forms of intentionally inflicted harm—namely
those causing the most severe kind of physical pain tantamount to death or organ failure or
psychological forms of pressure that cause permanent or prolonged mental harm—and that this
narrow ban applies only when interrogators specifically intend such harms but not when they are
seeking information to defend the nation from harm. The memos likely led to the use of
waterboarding and other notorious abuses at Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay.
183 Daniel Klaidman, Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6,
2006, at 34, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/57101.
184 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 151.
185 Id. at 148.
186 YOO, supra note 148, at 183 (emphasis removed).
187 Id.
188 Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 213 (2006). The
Goldsmith memo opined that it was legal for the U.S. to seize individuals from Iraq or other
territory over which it exercises de facto control and transfer them for purposes of interrogation in
other countries. A week after it was circulated, news broke of the use of “black sites” and a
covert CIA-chartered airline which moved CIA detainees from one secret facility to another. Id.
at 210-11.
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the fact that when Yoo wrote the OLC opinion of August 1, 2002 (the
memorandum that Goldsmith rescinded), Yoo also issued a second,
eighteen-page memorandum to the CIA on the same day, which
concluded that specific, proposed techniques including waterboarding
were compatible with international law.189 Goldsmith left the memo to
the CIA in place, with the effect of providing CIA personnel (who
ended up waterboarding several detainees hundreds of times) with what
Goldsmith describes as a “golden shield”190 that would protect them
against prosecutions under the Federal War Crimes Act (implementing
U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions) and the Federal AntiTorture Act (implementing U.S. obligations under the Torture
Convention).191
In December 2008 a bipartisan panel of twenty-five Senators
unanimously concluded that former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and several former high-level Whitehouse, Pentagon, and
Justice Department lawyers bear direct responsibility for serious human
rights abuses at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere.192 The
report concludes that “senior officials in the United States government
solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the
law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use
against detainees.”193 Specifically with respect to the responsibility of
the government lawyers, the report states: “Those OLC opinions
distorted the meaning and intent of anti-torture laws, rationalized the
abuse of detainees in U.S. custody and influenced Department of
Defense determinations as to what interrogation techniques were legal

189 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 155-56. In explaining why he did not rescind the August 1,
2002 Yoo-Bybee memo to the CIA, Goldsmith writes:
And in contrast to my sense of the Defense Department techniques [which Goldsmith
believed would be legally justified under proper legal analysis], I wasn’t as confident
that the CIA techniques [including waterboarding] could be approved under a proper
legal analysis. I didn’t affirmatively believe they were illegal either, or else I would
have stopped them. I just didn’t yet know. And I wouldn’t know until we had figured
out the proper interpretation of the torture statute, and whether the CIA techniques
were consistent with that proper legal analysis.
Id. The August 1, 2002 Yoo-Bybee memo to the CIA was publicly released by the Obama
Administration on April 19, 2009, and is available at http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/
aclu/olc_08012002_bybee.pdf. A 2005 OLC Memo, which was released on the same day,
documents that certain Guantanamo detainees were subjected to waterboarding as many as 183
times. See Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2009, at A1.
190 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 144.
191 Lawrence Velvel, The Mainstream Media Anoints Jack Goldsmith a Hero, OPEDNEWS,
Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.opednews.com/articles/1/opedne_lawrence_071012_the_mainstream
_media.htm.
192 Joby Warrick & Karen DeYoung, Report on Detainee Abuse Blames Top Bush Officials,
WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2008, at A1.
193 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xii.

SCHARF.31-1

90

10/1/2009 8:41:58 AM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

for use during interrogations conducted by U.S. military personnel.”194
Citing the Nuremberg-era Alstoetter case, Jose Alverez, a
Columbia Law School professor who had served as an AttorneyAdviser in L and later as President of the American Society of
International Law, concluded: “[W]hen government lawyers torture the
rule of law as gravely as [Yoo, Addington, Haynes, and Goldsmith]
have done here, international as well as national crimes may have been
committed, including by the lawyers themselves.”195 “Men of law,” the
prosecutor of the Alstoetter case told the Nuremberg judges in 1946,
“can no more escape . . . responsibility by virtue of their judicial robes
than the general by his uniform.”196 The analogy here is not to the scale
of the atrocities, but rather to the theory of liability. Consistent with this,
human rights and civil rights organizations have called for domestic
prosecution of these individuals in the United States under federal
statutes that criminalize torture and war crimes,197 and some of the
victims have lodged civil suits against them in federal court.198 At the
same time, criminal complaints against these individuals have been filed
in Spain, Germany, France, Argentina, and Sweden under “universal
jurisdiction” statutes enabling them to prosecute anyone responsible for
torture that is present in their territory.199
Meanwhile, in 2004, 2006, and 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court
issued a trio of opinions on the detainee issue that began to swing the
pendulum back in favor of international law and away from unfettered
Presidential power in the war on terror. In 2004, the Court decided the
194
195

Id. at xxvii.
Alvarez, supra note 188, at 223. According to Professor Alvarez’s critique, the authors of
the OLC Memos misconstrued various U.S. treaty obligations prohibiting torture or ignored them
altogether; they ignored the plain meaning of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; they
turned the Convention Against Torture into the convention for certain kinds of torture when it
came to actions outside the United States; and they selectively chose non-U.S. judicial authorities
to reflect conclusions concerning the severity of pain needed to constitute torture and dismissed
customary law in a way that was cavalier and reckless.
196 SANDS, supra note 146, at 26 (alteration in original).
197 Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Asks Justice Department to Appoint
Independent Prosecutor to Investigate Torture (Mar. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/39060prs20090318.html?s_src=RSS (includes text of letter
to Attorney General Eric Holder from ACLU Executive Director Anthony Romero).
198 Jose Padilla, the first American citizen to be designated an “unlawful enemy combatant,”
represented by the Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School, has filed a
suit against John Yoo for authoring the Torture Memos. See John Schwartz, Judge Allows Civil
Lawsuit over Claims of Torture, N. Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/us/politics/14yoo.html.
199 The Center for Constitutional Rights named Rumsfeld, Bybee, Yoo, Goldsmith, and other
former government lawyers in a complaint it filed in Karlsruhe, Germany. Sherwood Ross, Many
High Bush Officials Violated Anti-Torture Laws, AM. CHRON., Jan. 13, 2009, available at
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/printfriendly/87739. Similar criminal complaints
have also been filed against Rumsfeld and others in Argentina, France, Sweden, and most
recently in Spain. See Jane Mayer, The Bush Six, NEW YORKER, Apr. 13, 2009, at 23, available
at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/2009/04/13/090413ta_talk_mayer.
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case of Rasul v. Bush, rejecting by a 6-to-3 majority the President’s
contention that Guantanamo Bay was outside of the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts, and ruling that detainees there must be provided access to legal
assistance and given judicial review of the legality of their detention.200
The Bush Administration purported to implement the Rasul decision by
establishing a Combatant Status Review Tribunal at Guantanamo Bay to
determine on a case-by-case basis the status of the Guantanamo Bay
detainees.201 The Combat Status Review Tribunal process did not,
however, provide the detainee’s assistance of counsel or any means to
find or present evidence to challenge the Government’s case. A few
months later, when Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 (popularly known as the McCain Amendment),202 which
prohibited inhumane treatment of detainees, including those at
Guantanamo Bay, President Bush issued a signing statement in which
he asserted his Constitutional authority to depart from the law when
warranted by interests of national security.203
Next, in the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court
held by a 5-3 majority that the military tribunals established by
Executive Order to prosecute accused al Qaeda terrorists were unlawful
because their procedures “violate both the [Uniform Code of Military
Justice] and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.”204 The Supreme
Court confirmed that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
applied to all Guantanamo detainees, whether they were Taliban or alQaeda. “Common Article 3,” wrote the Court, “affords some minimal
protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to
individuals who are involved in a conflict in the territory of a
signatory.” The Court reached this conclusion by looking at the official
commentaries to the Geneva Convention, which confirmed its wide
scope. The Court invoked the U.S. Army’s Law of War Handbook,
which described Common Article 3 as “a minimum yardstick of
protection in all conflicts, not just internal armed conflicts.”205 The
200
201

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review
Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707
review.pdf.
202 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739. To avoid the
President’s threatened veto, the detainee treatment legislation was revised before enactment to
exempt the CIA from its requirements and to stipulate that detainees do not have a right to
challenge their detention in a U.S. court.
203 Press Release, President George W. Bush, President’s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863
(Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2005/12/20051230-8.html. John Yoo has explained the significance of the signing statement in
the following terms: “McCain’s amendment did not explicitly prohibit necessity or self-defense
as common law defenses. Thus, under the law, these defenses will continue to exist, as they did
in the earlier 1994 anti-torture law.” YOO, supra note 148, at 200.
204 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
205 Id. at 631 n.63.

SCHARF.31-1

92

10/1/2009 8:41:58 AM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

Court also relied on decisions of the International Court of Justice and
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Shortly thereafter, at the urging of President Bush, the Republicancontrolled Congress responded by enacting the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, which provided a legislative basis for Military
Commissions to try unlawful enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay
and stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear suits by enemy
combatants relating to any aspect of their transfer, detention, treatment,
trial, or conditions of confinement.206 Two years later, in the case of
Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court declared parts of the Military
Commissions Act unconstitutional, determined that the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals were “inadequate,” and ruled that the 270
foreign detainees held for years at Guantanamo Bay have the right to
appeal to U.S. civilian courts to challenge their indefinite imprisonment
without charges.207 Guantanamo was designed as a law-free zone, a
place where the government could subject detainees to indefinite
incarceration and harsh interrogation techniques without having to
worry about the legality of such action. The Boumediene decision
undercut a core rationale for keeping the detention facility off American
soil. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority,
acknowledged the terrorism threat the U.S. faces, but he declared: “The
laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in
extraordinary times.”208
Over and over again, the Bush Administration had asserted “we
don’t do torture.” That pretense was definitively put to rest on January
14, 2009, when Susan Crawford, the Bush Administration-appointed
Convening Authority of the U.S. Military Commissions and a former
Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,
announced the dropping of charges against Mohamed al-Qahtani, the
detainee for whom the enhanced interrogation policy was originally
designed. Without equivocation, Crawford declared, “We tortured
[Mohammed al-]Qahtani. His treatment met the legal definition of
torture. And that’s why I did not refer the case [for prosecution].”209
A week later, on January 20, 2009, Barack Obama was sworn in as
the 44th President of the United States. Just two days into his
presidency, on January 22, 2009, President Obama signed Executive
Orders requiring the closure of the Guantanamo Bay facility within
twelve months,210 the dismantling of the CIA’s network of secret prisons
206
207
208
209

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3930, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
Id. at 2277.
Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1
(first alteration in original).
210 Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and
Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009),
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around the globe, and prohibiting the CIA from using coercive
interrogation methods that deviate from the requirements of the Army
Field Manual.211 The Executive Order on Interrogations specifically
prohibits U.S. government personnel or agents from relying on the OLC
Memos in interpreting federal criminal laws, the Convention against
Torture, or the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. This changing of the guard is not the end of the story—
for closing down Guantanamo will present significant challenges to the
new Administration—but it is the beginning of the end.
D.

Lessons from this Modern Case Study

What does this case study tell us about the nature of international
law? First, if one were to have taken what could be called a “semiotic
snapshot” of the detainee story when the Torture Memos first leaked out
in 2004, the perception of the United States’ commitment to comply
with international law would be very different than the perception
reflected by the legislative, judicial, and executive branch actions in
2008-09.
Second, the case study demonstrates that to understand State
interests and behavior, the State must be disaggregated into its
components, and sometimes those components must be further
disaggregated. Normally, the President would receive legal advice from
top agency lawyers throughout the government, often with conflicting
interpretations of international law. L would ordinarily be among the
entities advocating most forcefully for compliance with international
law. In this case, however, the normal process of inclusive clearance
was for a short time circumvented by a like-minded cabal of aggressive
lawyers calling themselves the “war cabinet,” whose influence initially
masked the considerable inter- and intra-departmental disagreement and
dominated detainee policy. 212
Eventually, both Congress and the Supreme Court inserted
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ClosureOfGuantanamoDetention
Facilities/.
211 Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations/.
212 John Yoo has been quite open in explaining why the “war cabinet” cut L out of the
decision-making process concerning treatment of detainees: “The State Department and OLC
often disagreed about international law. State believed that international law had a binding effect
on the President, indeed on the United States, both internationally and domestically,” whereas
Yoo did not hold to that view. YOO, supra note 148, at 33. Rather than prove that international
law was not relevant, the intentional circumvention of L indicates that Yoo and his fellow “war
cabinet” members believed that if the top policy-makers were made aware of L’s views about the
applicable international legal constraints, they would be much less likely to approve the
extraordinary interrogation tactics advocated by the “war cabinet.”
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themselves into the question, and thereby forced the President to alter
his policies in order to bring them into accord with their view of the
requirements of the Torture Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and
customary international law. As former State Department Legal
Adviser John Bellinger recounts, the government legal offices
(including L) that had been frozen out of the initial legal and policy
decisions ended up playing an influential role in formulating the new
interpretations and policies:
When I moved to the State Department with Secretary Rice in
2005, first as Senior Adviser and ultimately as Legal Adviser, I was
deeply concerned by international (and domestic) perceptions that
the Bush Administration not only did not believe in international law
but was actively hostile towards it. . . .
....
In the Bush Administration’s second term, L lawyers . . . led the
efforts inside the Administration to clarify and adopt a more robust
legal framework for the detention, treatment, and prosecution of
captured terrorists. . . .
....
L was instrumental in helping Secretary Rice persuade the rest of
the Administration to move high-level al Qaeda detainees held by the
Central Intelligence Agency to Guantanamo in September, 2006, so
that they could be prosecuted for their offenses, given access to
counsel and the [International Committee of the Red Cross], and no
longer held in undisclosed locations. L attorneys also tried hard to
ensure that the CIA’s interrogation program, and the President’s
Executive Order applicable to it, were consistent with the Detainee
Treatment Act in 2005 and the Hamdan decision in 2006, which
concluded that Common Article 3 applied to the treatment of al
Qaeda detainees.213

Third, consistent with institutionalist and constructivist models, the
positions of the State Department Legal Adviser and his counterparts in
the various branches of the armed services demonstrated that important
bureaucratic players perceived the Torture Convention, Geneva
Conventions, and customary international law as applicable and
binding. Like the State Department Office of the Legal Adviser, the
legal offices of the various services were staffed by careerists who had
internalized and absorbed a strong belief in the constraints and value of
international law.214 George W. Bush’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Richard Myers, explained the nature of this culture of
213 Supplement to Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note
10, ch. 13, E-mail Exchange between John Bellinger, Legal Adviser to President George W.
Bush, and author (2009) (on file with author).
214 See Davis Robinson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 16 n.333 (describing L as “the moral conscience of American
foreign policy”).
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compliance in the following terms: “We train our people to obey the
Geneva Conventions, it’s not even a matter of whether it is
reciprocated—it’s a matter of who we are.”215 Their views were
reinforced by the positions taken by foreign bodies and international
organizations. In particular, the U.N. Secretary-General, the U.N.
Special Rapporteurs on Torture and Arbitrary Detention, the United
Kingdom House of Commons, the International Committee of the Red
Cross, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights all opined
that the United States’ treatment of detainees was inconsistent with the
requirements of international law.216
These same bureaucratic players repeatedly warned about
reciprocity costs and the prospects of prosecution for violating the
international prohibition against torture. Concern about bilateral
retaliation adds credence to the Goldsmith/Posner paradigm, but
concern about long-term multilateral or systemic reciprocity suggests
something else entirely. When career lawyers warn that third States
will cite U.S. actions that dismiss or minimize international law as
precedent in their relations with their neighboring countries (e.g., Russia
and Georgia), they are expressing concern about increasing international
instability through the weakening of the rule of law at large.
While concern by government officials about criminal prosecution
or civil suit under domestic statutes (that also happen to incorporate
international law) may not constitute evidence disproving Goldsmith
and Posner’s claims, concern for prosecution in third States or
international tribunals under the international law concept of universal
jurisdiction as codified in the Torture Convention and Geneva
Conventions does suggest an exogeneous influence of international law.
Moreover, when U.S. courts interpret international law as a limit to
Executive Power, as the Supreme Court did in Hamdan, we are seeing
the concrete effects of internalization of international law by a
disaggregated State. Furthermore, civil actions and criminal complaints
cannot be so cavalierly dismissed as “lawfare” when they are brought
by respected American-based lawyers’ groups and civil rights
organizations or by allied democratic governments.217
215
216

SANDS, supra note 146, at 33; see also OSIEL, supra note 76, at 330-33.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n. on Human Rights, Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120
(Feb. 27, 2006); HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
REPORT 2005, 2005-6, H.C. 574, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmfaff/574/57402.htm; ORG. OF AM. STATES, INTER-AM. COMM’N ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (Mar. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.photius.com/rogue_nations/guantanamo.html; Neil Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee
Abuse in Guantanamo, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at A1.
217 Neal Katyal, the lawyer who briefed and argued the Hamdan case before the federal courts,
has described the motivation of the plaintiff’s lawyers involved in litigating the detainee issue in
the following terms: “This is the new civil rights movement. Now it’s international law, and

SCHARF.31-1

96

10/1/2009 8:41:58 AM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

Finally, influential players within the Executive and Legislative
branches stressed the important role of reputational concerns in setting
detainee policy. The bipartisan commission that investigated the attacks
of September 11, 2001 concluded in a report in 2005 that “the U.S.
policy on treating detainees is undermining the war on terrorism by
tarnishing America’s reputation as a moral leader.”218 The 2008 Senate
bipartisan committee report similarly observed: “The impact of those
abuses has been significant.”219 Citing polls indicating that Abu Ghraib
and Guantanamo Bay have generated negative perceptions of the United
States as a country that does not respect or abide by the rule of law by
the populations and government officials of countries around the globe,
including our closest democratic allies, the report concluded: “The fact
that America is seen in a negative light by so many complicates our
ability to attract allies to our side, strengthens the hand of our enemies,
and reduces our ability to collect intelligence that can save lives.”220
Consequently, concern about reputation is a much more important
factor in determining compliance with international law than Goldsmith
and Posner have acknowledged, especially in a situation where the
initial decision to depart from international obligations produced such
immediate and significant reputational costs.
CONCLUSION
“Under our theory,” write Goldsmith and Posner in The Limits of
International Law, “international law does not pull states toward
compliance contrary to their interests.”221 The qualitative empirical data
and case study of the treatment of detainees set forth above highlight the
major flaws in Goldsmith and Posner’s approach, proving their
theoretical model to be neither accurately descriptive nor predictive.
In contrast to Goldsmith and Posner’s conjectural musings about
State behavior in the historic case studies described in their book, this
Article has provided a look inside the heretofore opaque box of U.S.
foreign policy decision-making, spanning five Presidents. For many
readers, this may be their first introduction to L—an influential office
which has internalized international law and made its compliance part
of its bureaucratic identity.
This Article has divulged for the first time several instances during
especially international humanitarian law.” OSIEL, supra note 76, at 340.
218 Barbara Slavin, Abuse of Detainees Undercuts U.S. Authority, 9/11 Panel Says, USA
TODAY, Nov. 15, 2005, at 8A.
219 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xxv.
220 Id.
221 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 13.
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the past thirty years in which, at L’s urging, U.S. policy-makers decided
to forego the use of force or other policy preferences in order to comply
with international law. It has also disclosed many cases in which, at L’s
counsel, the methods selected or the justifications employed were
shaped to comply with international law. Contrary to Goldsmith and
Posner’s hypothesis, the Legal Advisers have managed to convince
decision-makers that international law is real law, and that the
advantages of complying with it almost always outweigh the short-term
benefits of breaching it. As Michael Matheson, who spent thirty years
in L, observed: “So there really is a spectrum in which perhaps only on
the extreme end of the spectrum does international law always win the
day, but even on other parts of the spectrum, international law is a
definite constraint on policy makers.”222
The Legal Advisers perceive multilateral reciprocity, reputation as
a law-abiding State, and desire to maintain order and promote the rule
of law as components of the compliance pull of international law.
Goldsmith and Posner’s economics-based rational choice approach
would therefore be more valuable if they were to define “compliance
pull” in these terms. We could then more accurately test whether
international law has an independent causal impact on State behavior by
examining cases such as the detainee issue where short-term selfinterests predict one behavior and long-term interests, such as those
identified by the Legal Advisers, predict another.223
In the final analysis, the qualitative empirical data has shown that
international law is real because it plays a real role in shaping the
conduct of States (even a superpower in times of crisis). International
law matters because government lawyers and policy-makers use it and
are influenced by it. Rather than ask, “Did the relevant actors feel
compelled to obey international law?,” a more useful question is, “How
did international law affect their behavior?”224 In this regard, the
observations of the Legal Advisers and the qualitative empirical data set
forth in this Article tell us much about how international law is actually
used for legitimating political actions, for rallying support, for imposing
restraints, and for persuading policy-makers to choose a particular
course to achieve their desired goals.

222 Michael Matheson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 14.
223 Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 7, at 1442.
224 See AARON FICHTELBERG, LAW AT THE VANISHING POINT: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (2008).

